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ABSTRACT
The Electoral Strategy of Legislative Politics: Balancing Party and Member
Reputation in Japan and Taiwan
by
Akitaka Matsuo
This research explores how political parties coordinate competing objectives, such
as winning elections and influencing public policy with demands from their legisla-
tors whose interests lie principally in re-election and policy distribution. Electoral
and legislative institutions aﬀect the prioritizing of these goals and the appropriate
strategy by which to achieve them. Utilizing two East Asian democracies, Japan and
Taiwan, the thesis evaluates this argument via the econometric analysis of various
aspects of legislative behavior and policy outcomes, such as committee assignments
and deliberations, and intergovernmental fiscal transfers. In regard to committee ac-
tivities, there exists a significant diﬀerence between governing and opposition parties
in terms of the expected role of their members on legislative committees. In regard
to fiscal transfers, governing parties distribute fiscal resources strategically to party
strongholds.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
When incumbent legislators seek reelection, they potentially have several strategies
to utilize. As the seminal paper by Carey and Shugart (1995) argues, candidates can
either campaign on their personal reputations or party reputations, and the eﬃcacy of
each is largely dependent on the political institutions in existence, especially electoral
institutions.
In a state with an electoral system which makes a personal-vote seeking strategy
more eﬀective, incumbents want to obtain resources which can be useful to distinguish
themselves from fellow members of the legislature and make appeals to their current
and potential constituencies. For example, they might want to be a sponsor of a
bill to help these constituencies’ needs and successfully pass the bill to make such
a distinguished appeal. By doing so, they can not only provide a benefit to their
supporters but also demonstrate their competency. Members might also want to
serve on legislative committees closely related to their electoral district’s interests,
which can also help them to bring pork back to their district more directly. In
the last two examples, concerning committee seats and the fiscal resources of the
2government, provisions of such resources are strictly limited, and incumbents are in
competition with other members for procuring such resources. If the electoral benefit
an incumbent gets from these resources is large, the competition might be severe and
could result in a situation which no one wants. For instance, incumbents’ excessive
demands for fiscal distribution can lead to large deficits which have to be resolved
with large-scale spending reductions unpopular to citizens. Likewise, an overflow of
legislative bills introduced by legislators seeking credit-claiming opportunities might
result in the incapability of the legislature to resolve urgent problems
Although there are several possible ways to avoid such tragic outcomes, this
dissertation particularly focuses on the case where political parties in the legislature
are expected to take responsibility for this, and examines how parties resolve these
diﬃculties and allocate limited political resources appropriately. To explore the
subject, this dissertation studies legislative activities and policy outcomes in Japan
and Taiwan. As the following short descriptions of politics in these two countries
illustrate, they are appropriate subjects because of the fairly strong personal vote
incentives, especially under the electoral systems existing before electoral reforms,
and because of the existence of dominant parties which came to control legislative
processes.
31.1 Context of Japanese Politics
The time span this dissertation covers is the years from 1980 to 2005. This section
provides a brief overview of Japanese politics in this period, focusing on how political
institutions shaped the incentive structures of parties and their members.
Characteristics of Japanese politics are largely defined by features of two political
institutions. The first is the fact that Japan is a parliamentary democracy, and the
second is that the electoral systems for the House of Representatives enhance the
incentives for personal vote cultivation.
In many parliamentary democracies, the legislative arena is dominated by the
cabinet, and Japan is an example of such a case. Table 1.1, which provides a general
overview of legislation after 1955, illustrates the point. In the entire period after
the formation of the dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), cabinet bills make
up the largest proportion of bills discussed in the Chamber, and the success rate of
legislation is much lower for member bills than for cabinet bills.
The pessimistic view of the Japanese Diet contends that it was just a rubber
stamp to approve the cabinet’s legislative agenda. Although this view was coun-
tered by a number of studies which have demonstrated the opposition influence in
legislation (e.g. Mochizuki, 1982), it is obvious that the governing parties had been
successfully passing bills on which their members shared some urgency. Under such
4Table 1.1 : Legislation in the Japanese Diet
Member Bills Cabinet Bills
Proportion of Number Success Number Success
Period Years Member Bills of Bills Rate of Bills Rate
LDP Dominance I 1955-1974 9.7% 31.3 17.9% 63.9 82.3%
LDP Dominance II 1974-1986 15.5% 23.8 21.2% 34.4 80.2%
LDP Dominance III 1986-1989 10.9% 10.1 35.2% 35.6 81.6%
Divided Chamber I 1989-1993 13.2% 13.6 31.3% 30.7 91.0%
Coalition Government I 1993-1998 12.3% 17.6 26.7% 35.8 93.7%
Coalition Government II 1998-2007 16.5% 36.0 25.8% 50.9 92.4%
Divided Chamber II 2007-2009 25.5% 30.9 24.5% 26.6 83.3%
From Koga, Makihara and Okumura (2010)
conditions, opposition parties’ strategies for the legislative arena are predictably dif-
ferent from those of the governing parties. To be more specific, as will be seen
in Chapter 2, attainable goals from the legislative arena and available resources to
achieve them are diﬀerent between the governing and opposition parties, and there-
fore parties use their resources in diﬀerent ways.
The second political institution that has had a large impact on Japanese politics
is the electoral system. Until 1996, general elections to the House of Representa-
tives had been held under the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system. Carey
and Shugart (1995) categorize SNTV as one of the electoral systems which enhances
personal-vote seeking incentives. In this electoral system, individual candidates di-
rectly compete with their co-partisans for votes if multiple candidates from the same
5party run in the same district, and voters cast a single vote for a candidate. The
average district magnitude in House of Representatives elections was 3.8 under the
SNTV system, meaning that if a party wanted to attain a legislative majority, it was
forced to win multiple seats in the same district which pitted candidates from the
same party in direct electoral competition against one another. When candidates
have to compete with their co-partisans, they cannot rely on the party label to dis-
tinguish themselves from these rivals. This is the reason why personal vote incentives
under SNTV are particularly strong, in one sense even stronger than those found in
single member district elections.
1.1.1 The LDP One-Party Dominance
The LDP had been the governing party in Japan from 1955 to 2008, except for a
short period of nine months in 1993, when an anti-LDP coalition was formed after
a general election to the House of Representatives. The survival of the LDP regime
was predicated on successful exploitation of these political institutions.
The LDP was formed in 1955 to counteract the reunification of the Japanese
Socialist Party (JSP). The JSP split into Leftist and Rightist Socialist Parties in
1948, mainly because of diﬀerences of opinion toward the US-led pacification after
WWII. After the split, both parties had increased their number of seats held in the
6house in every general election. Being afraid of a socialist takeover of the government
following the unification of the political left, leaders of the two largest conservative
parties, the Liberal and Democratic Parties, agreed to merge in order to form a
united front toward the JSP.
For some time after its formation, the LDP had a large proportion of seats in
both houses of the Diet and enjoyed majority popular support in elections. However,
popular support for the LDP continuously decreased over time and after the 1963
general election, the party never again garnered the majority of votes in an election
for either house. In the legislature, the LDP successfully managed to maintain a
majority of the House of Representatives until 1993.1
In order to cope with the declining support and keep a majority in the chambers,
the LDP exploited the political institutions described above. As to the legislative
process, the LDP virtually monopolized agenda-setting power (Cox, Masuyama and
McCubbins, 2000). Although opposition resistance to legislation had a substantial
influence in delaying its passage, the LDP successfully passed bills crucially important
to the party’s policy agenda, and allowed less important bills to be terminated before
being placed on the plenary agenda (Masuyama, 2003). In order to make this system
work smoothly, the LDP had to make sure that its members were amenable to
1 In some elections, they could not win the majority of seats. However, they could lure newly
elected conservative members, who could not obtain the LDP endorsement, and the number
of these late-joiners was enough to secure the majority.
7its discipline at every stage of the legislative process. Chapter 2 shows how this
motivation worked at the committee stage.
Exploiting its position as a dominant party, the LDP members could exercise sig-
nificant influence on policy formation. The agreements on the party’s policy agenda
were formed in the Policy Aﬀairs Research Council (PARC). Each LDP member
was aﬃliated with a section (bukai) of the PARC. Members with low seniority ac-
quired policy expertise by continuously serving on the same section for years, and
could eventually become key players in that policy area (Inoguchi and Iwai, 1989).
Party members from the same district usually ended up specializing in diﬀerent pol-
icy areas in order to claim credit for policies related to the district, in an eﬀort to
cultivate personal votes under SNTV (McCubbins and Rosenbluth, 1995; McKean
and Scheiner, 2000). As Hirano (2006) showed, fiscal transfers during the SNTV
period were significantly influenced by members’ eﬀorts to bring pork to their elec-
toral strongholds. Chapter 3 studies how the system of exchanging benefits through
this selective specialization in policy area altered after the 1996 electoral reform to
introduce a mixed member majoritarian system, and finds strong party influence on
the allocation of particularistic spending.
The opposition parties were marginalized because of LDP dominance. The oppo-
sition parties could not exercise much influence over the government’s policy decision-
8making. However, members of oppositions were also under the pressure of cultivating
personal votes and they tried to make the most of the limited resources. One of the
resources available to opposition parties was legislative activities at the committee
stage. As I have showed elsewhere, speech contents of the opposition party members
in the committees of House of Representatives were altered strategically depending
on the context in which members deliver speeches (Matsuo and Matsumoto, 2011).
Chapter 2 also shows that the diﬀerence between opposition and government is re-
flected in committee assignments and participation.
1.2 Context of Taiwanese Politics
In contrast to the stable history of Japanese democracy after WWII, Taiwanese
politics and political institutions were much more unstable. Taiwan is a country
with a semi-presidential system with an elected president who appoints a premier to
be head of the Executive Yuan. The variation in semi-presidential systems is larger
than pure parliamentary or presidential systems (Shugart, 2005). Under Taiwan’s
current constitution, the Legislative Yuan can pass a motion of no confidence; if
the motion passes the premier has to resign within ten days, but can dissolve the
Legislative Yuan under the advisory of the president.
One of the most prominent characteristics of Taiwanese politics is the existence of
9the Kuomintang (KMT). After retreating the government of the Republic of China
(ROC) to the island of Taiwan in 1949, the KMT ruled the island under author-
itarian control. Under this authoritarian control, KMT leaders, especially Chiang
Ching-kuo, implemented various economic reforms and development plans. Taiwan
experienced rapid economic growth and had successfully built a modern, developed
economy by the end of the 1990s.
The political system of Taiwan began to democratize in the 1960s. Though the
general election for the Legislative Yuan could not be held because the ROC had lost
the control of the mainland, the first supplementary election to the Legislative Yuan
was held in 1969 to replace members who left the chamber and to add additional
members to the Legislative Yuan. These supplementary elections have been held
regularly since then. Although the formation of opposition parties was prohibited,
a large number of non-KMT (Tangwai) candidates competed in these elections and
won seats.
The process of democratization made drastic progress under the presidency of
Lee Teng-Hui, who became acting president for the late Chiang Ching-Kuo starting
in 1988. He announced the start of constitutional reform in his inaugural address
in 1990, and promised the introduction of democratic reforms within two years.
As a result of several constitutional reforms, a fully democratic re-election for the
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Legislative Yuan was held in 1992 and the first presidential election was held in 1996,
which Lee won. The second fully democratic election for the third-term Legislative
Yuan was held in 1995 and Chapter 4 of this dissertation covers the Legislative Yuan
from the third to the sixth term.
In contrast to national politics, where the KMT dominated, the politics of sub-
national governments was the place where local political elites were able to have
significant influence. Since the 1950s, elections for local oﬃces had been held regu-
larly, and the KMT did not have much support from benshengren (Taiwan natives).
In order to make up for the lack of connections, the party gradually developed a
patron-client network with local factions where the party provided privileges and
economic benefits in return for political support for the party (Wu, 2003). These
sorts of networks between parties and local factions remained in local politics after
democratization, though their strengths were getting weaker because the presence
of the KMT in the economy was reduced due to the rise of the mainland economy
(Wu, 2003), and the factions were seeking ties with the Democratic Progressive Party
(DPP) as a result of the party change in the presidency in 2000 (Mattlin, 2006).
Although such dynamics of local politics will not be the main focus of this dis-
sertation, the research question of Chapter 4 on committee assignments in the Leg-
islative Yuan is about the interactive eﬀects of such local interests, measured by vote
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concentration, and legislative institutions. During the period this dissertation cov-
ers, Legislative Yuan elections were contested under a mixed member system with
SNTV and party-list proportional representation, and for SNTV members, personal
vote seeking was predictably strong as is the case of Japan.
1.3 Plan of the Thesis
This dissertation consists of three independent chapters, each of which investigates
various aspects of the overall theme of this thesis: How do parties resolve the overflow
of incumbents’ demands for limited resources? Chapters 2 and 4 study an impor-
tant arena in the legislative process, which is legislative committees in Japan and
Taiwan. In these two countries, legislative committees are fairly strong. Standing
committees in each chamber have clearly defined jurisdictions, all bills have to go
through committee deliberation to pass, and committees have strong bill initiation
authority. These chapters look into how parties control limited resources such as
committee seats and speech time.
Chapter 2 investigates the standing committees of the Japanese House of Repre-
sentatives from 1980 to 2005. In particular, this chapter studies how political parties
and legislators utilize committee assignment, committee attendance, and speeches
in committees to accomplish competing goals such as securing members’ reelection,
12
passing legislation and establishing the party reputation. The goals and constraints
in using committee resources are diﬀerent for governing and opposition parties. As
the governing parties are supported by the majority of the parliament, they focus
more on passing legislation, while opposition parties focus on establishing party
reputation and helping electorally vulnerable members. Chapter 4 investigates the
standing committees of the Taiwanese Legislative Yuan from 1995 to 2007, focus-
ing on the electoral incentives of committee assignments. This chapter investigates
how the shift from the absence to the presence of legislative institutions changes the
mechanism of self-selection onto distributive committees. In particular, this chapter
studies the eﬀect of the 2001 reforms in the committee systems of the Legislative
Yuan, which installed party control in committee assignments.
Chapter 3 investigates fiscal transfers to local governments, focusing on the char-
acteristics of the Japanese electoral system introduced in 1996. This chapter sheds
new light on the research agenda of the targets of particularistic spending by inves-
tigating the early period under the mixed member majoritarian system in Japan. I
utilize a unique characteristic of this electoral system in which electoral support for
parties and candidates are separated on the ballot and therefore can be observed
independently from each other. Using fiscal data from 1997-2002, this chapter shows
that the governing parties dominate this domain, funneling fiscal transfers to dis-
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tricts that provide strong support for the party. Individual candidates, however, do
not have suﬃcient control over resources to galvanize a personal vote by rewarding
supporters. However, influential members of the governing parties can provide goods
to their core supporters. Chapter 5 summarizes the findings from individual chapters
and discusses their implications.
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Chapter 2
Committee Attendance, Member Replacement
and Speech in the Japanese House of
Representatives
Chapter Abstract
This chapter investigates the legislative activities of members of the Japanese House
of Representatives. In particular, it examines how political parties and legislators uti-
lize committee assignment, attendance, and speeches to accomplish competing goals
such as securing members’ reelection, passing legislation and establishing party repu-
tation. In order to achieve these goals, parties assign members to proper committees,
pressure members to attend committees when needed, and provide opportunities to
deliver legislative speeches. Facing diﬀerent constraints on available resources to
pursue these goals, governing and opposition parties prioritize the aforementioned
goals diﬀerently. Governing parties focus more on passing legislation, while opposi-
tion parties focus on establishing party reputation and helping electorally vulnerable
members through deliberations. To test this argument, I compile an original, com-
prehensive dataset of committee assignments and membership replacements from
1980 to 2005 in the Japanese House of Representatives, which allows an unlimited
number of temporally member replacements.
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2.1 Introduction
Legislative committees play numerous important roles in many parliamentary democ-
racies, especially in countries with strong, established committee systems (Mattson
and Strøm, 1995). In such countries, committees are a central part of the legislative
processes. For instance, committees control the timetable for legislation and thus
are able to delay the passage of critical legislations (Do¨ring, 1995b). Committees
can also change the content of legislation by redrafting government bills and initi-
ating legislation. In addition, parties in the coalition utilize legislative committees
to reduce the policy loss created by disagreement between coalition partners in a
country with a coalition government. Deliberations at committee meetings provide
coalition partners with additional time to scrutinize policy details(Martin and Van-
berg, 2005). Holding committee chairs oﬀers a chance to monitor cabinet ministers
by allocating chairs to a party other than that which holds the cabinet minister (Kim
and Loewenberg, 2005; Carroll and Cox, 2012).
The previous research on legislative committees in parliamentary democracies
reveals the important role of committees in party politics but tends to overlook
the importance of committees for individual members of legislatures. As volumi-
nous studies of the US Congress have shown, committee appointments can be an
important resource for members to achieve their goals. Under the individualistic un-
derstanding, Congressional committees are regarded as a mechanism to implement
stable exchange of members’ policy benefits based on their district interests (Wein-
gast and Marshall, 1988), and members assigned to the committee closely related
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to their constituents’ interests are benefited in votes and campaign financing (Grier
and Munger, 1991). In contrast to extensive research on the US Congress, scholars
have given little attention to this issue in comparative legislative studies, except for
studies on European Parliament (e.g. McElroy 2006; Yordanova 2009).
This chapter attempts to fill this gap by exploring how parties and individual
members in the Japanese House of Representatives use committee appointments and
committee activities to achieve legislative and electoral goals. The Japanese Diet
is a legislature with well-developed committee systems in which deliberations have
substantive impacts on policy outcomes. In such chambers, selections of committee
members and their activities impact the legislative processes. Parties in the legis-
lature control allocation of committee appointments in many countries, including
Japan, and can strategically use appointments to achieve legislative and electoral
goals.
To thoroughly explore this topic, this study focuses on one of the interesting
characteristics of the committee systems in the Diet: the high number of replace-
ments in committee memberships. In each meeting of the committees, as many as
thirty percent of members are temporarily replaced and return when the meeting has
concluded. Two types of replacements exist: those who attend a meeting to make a
speech and those who do not. Replacements who do not deliver speeches are exclu-
sively used to achieve legislative goals. Committee deliberations are a process for all
bills to go through before they are placed in the plenary agenda. In order to conclude
committee deliberation, all bills must be discussed in a certain number of committee
meetings, every one of which must satisfy quorum requirements. The key to un-
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derstanding frequent member replacements, especially ones without speeches, is the
procedural necessity for legislation. In contrast, replacements who make speeches
have more important meanings in party politics in Japan than replacements who
don’t.
The motivation behind the use of committee systems should diﬀer for governing
and opposition parties, because they have diﬀerent priorities, such as securing mem-
bers’ reelection, passing legislation and establishing party reputation. Governing
parties with the majority in the chamber can pass legislation as long as they can get
the support of their members in legislature. Governing parties have mandates from
electorates in the last election; meeting this expectation by making and implement-
ing policies will determine their performances in the next election. Therefore, their
primary goal is to pass legislations on issues on which party members can form agree-
ments. In contrast, since opposition parties cannot block legislation when governing
parties are cohesive, they focus on establishing party reputation and improving their
members’ reelection prospects through committee deliberations. To test hypotheses
derived from this argument, I compile an original dataset of comprehensive records
of the members of the House of Representatives from 1980 to 2005. The dataset in-
cludes all information about membership assignments and replacements, committee
attendance and speeches.
This chapter is organized as follows. In the following section, I briefly describe
the Diet rules about the committee assignments and allocation of time for speech.
The third section develops the theoretical argument of the chapter. Section four in-
troduces the data. Section five conducts empirical analysis of committee assignments
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and members activities. The last section summarizes the findings.
2.2 Committee Rules and Member Activities in the Japanese
House of Representatives
Compared to other parliamentary democracies, legislative committees in the Japanese
House of Representatives are moderately strong. Table 2.1 shows various aspects of
committee authorities in Japan compared to those of Western European countries,
including the European Parliament. For a majority of the categories, standing com-
mittees in Japan are strong authorities. Discussions in committees are a crucial part
of deliberations for legislation, because plenary session time is severely limited. The
duration of an ordinary session is only 150 days each year; at the end of each ses-
sion, all bills without final passage in both chambers are automatically terminated.
Therefore, even when governing parties hold the majority in both chambers, they
have to set the orders for bills to pass, allowing low priority bills to be scrapped. This
limited plenary time is the reason why opposition parties can have strong influence
on policy decisions and retrieve concessions from the governing parties (Mochizuki,
1982). For governing parties, this limited plenary time is an important resource to
influence rank-and-file members of the party (Masuyama, 2001).
All introduced bills are referred to a committee that has jurisdiction over the
content of bills. A resolution on the floor can skip the reference, although this
rule is rarely used. Once a bill is referred to a committee, its board of directors
set the schedule of deliberation and the total time for questions (Oyama, 2003).
At the beginning of committee deliberations, proposers of a bill explain the aim
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of legislation, and then committee members are allowed time for questions. After
discussion of a bill has concluded, the committee takes votes and sends it to the floor.
Governing parties want to secure the majority in committees, because failure to
win a majority vote makes passage of bill diﬃcult (although it does not necessarily
terminate it). The number of committee seats held by each party is automatically
determined in proportion to the number of seats that each party holds in the chamber;
approval by the Steering Committee is required to formally finalize it. Each party
then selects members from their party to represent them in each committee. The
Speaker of the House oﬃcially appoints members according to the list of members
submitted by parties.1
There are about twenty standing committees in the House of Representatives.2
Each committee has a chair person and several directors. In many committees,
majority parties possess the chairmanship, and director positions are allocated to
parties proportionally. Members of the House of Representatives are required to
hold at least one membership in standing committees; once assigned to a committee,
they hold the membership throughout a session. Members who are assigned to other
important posts, such as the speaker or cabinet ministers, are allowed to decline
appointment to committees.
Figure 2.1 shows the proportion of members who attend at least one meeting
in a session by seniority.3 Most members of the House of Representatives attend
committee meetings, but the proportion gradually declines as seniority increases.
1 For detailed description, see Oyama (2003) and Asano and Kohno (2008)
2 The number of committees changes over time; currently, there are 17 committees.
3 The sample of legislators is limited only to single member district candidates.
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There is a dip in the proportion of attendance for governing party members: fifth-
term members under the old single nontransferable vote (SNTV) system and fourth-
term members under the current mixed member majoritarian (MMM) system have
relatively low attendance rates. These dips are caused by appointments of members
to other oﬃces, which exempt them from committee membership requirements.
Figure 2.1 : Proportion of Lower House Members Who Attend Committee Meetings
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Since the number of seats in each committee is fixed, many members are not
awarded their desired assignments. Those who are not selected to a committee, how-
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ever, may have opportunities to participate in deliberations in committees. That is,
they can attend the meeting and make speeches as temporary members by replacing
current members. The House Rules allow parties to make any number of temporary
replacements in each meeting. They in fact make a large number of replacements
especially for important committees, such as the Committee on the Budget.
Sometimes current committee members want to be replaced temporarily by other
members, because they are unable to attend committee meetings for various reasons.
In that case, they can resign their committee post for that meeting, and their party
fills the vacancy by temporarily assigning a diﬀerent party member. More than
a half of members must be present in order to meet the quorum requirement to
hold a meeting. Governing parties have a stronger incentive to meet the quorum
requirement for several reasons. Taking votes at a committee is a requirement to
consider a bill on the plenary agenda; before taking vote for a bill, they must have
had deliberation for a certain amount of time agreed by the board of directors. Thus,
parties seeking to pass legislations must ensure that enough members attend every
committee meeting.
The board of directors for each committee determines the amount of question
time in each session. The House Rules stipulate that question time is allocated in
proportion to the number of seats held in the chamber; in practice, however, govern-
ing parties pass a large portion of question time to opposition parties. Directors of a
committee from each party decide to whom they allocate question time. Committee
members who are allocated time for questions determine what to discuss. The use of
this time is not strictly limited to questioning the bills; they can also deliver speeches
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on related topics (Matsuo and Matsumoto, 2011). Question time is followed by the
final deliberations by all parties to display opposition or approval to the bill.
Figure 2.2 shows the proportion of Diet members who make speeches in commit-
tee meetings. The proportion is much smaller than that of committee attendance in
Figure 2.1. The diﬀerence between governing and opposition parties is also larger for
speeches than attendances, though the diﬀerence is smaller under the new electoral
system, especially for members with low seniority. Under the present electoral sys-
tem, MMM, governing party members seem to be more active in making speeches.
This tendency is seen in Figure 2.3 as well, which shows the number of speeches
made by committee attendants. Under the former electoral system, SNTV, govern-
ing party members did not make many speeches, even if they were newly elected
members. In contrast, under the MMM system, the amount of speeches made by
freshmen and sophomores is much larger, although they still speak less than opposi-
tion party members.
2.3 Literature and Theory
This section develops a theoretical argument based on the partisan theory of legisla-
tive organization. As seen in the previous section, most members of the House of
Representatives in Japan attend committee meetings, and a majority of them make
speeches at the committee meetings. These committee memberships and allocation
of speech time are under partisan control, which is established by the rules of the
chamber.
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Figure 2.2 : Proportion of Lower House Members Who Make Speeches
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Figure 2.3 : Number of Speeches by Seniority
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2.3.1 Selection of Committee Members
Political parties are instruments for members to solve collective action problems and
provide public goods for members such as party label (Aldrich, 1995) or the rep-
utation of the governing parties (Cox and McCubbins, 2007). In both arguments,
political parties are the institutions that help their members’ reelection through
several measures. Aldrich (1995) claims that political parties are established by
ambitious politicians who want to have a mechanism to achieve their goal through
long-stabilized relationship, while Cox and McCubbins (2007) claim that the major-
ity party organizes the structures of the Congress in order to steer their members’
reelection goals from being damaged by members’ excessive demands for policies.
Committee assignments can be seen as the tool for achieving these goals. There
are multiple competing motivations for parties to appoint members to committees;
the priority of these goals can vary depending on the characteristics of a committee.
When a committee plays an important role in the debate of party politics, parties
have an incentive to send members who are suitable for that task. Some committees
are a key arena for partisan confrontation for primary political issues at that point
in time. In addition, committee deliberation is a good opportunity for oversight
of the government policies (Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1991; Pollack, 2003); this is
particularly important for opposition parties that need to criticize governments for
unresolved policy issues, as this is an eﬀective strategy to improve their prospects in
the next election. There are variations in the importance of committees and some
committees draw more attention from the media and voters.4 For such important
4 Another potential role of committee deliberations for governing parties is to oversee coalition
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committees, placing competent members is particularly important. This reasoning
leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2.1 Parties appoint competent members to committees that are impor-
tant for partisan debates.
In the context of the Japanese Diet, the Committee on the Budget is by far the
most important committee for partisan politics, because it functions as a substitute
for the plenary sessions in terms of deliberations for key legislation. The plenary
bottleneck problem (Cox, 2006) is remarkably serious in the Japanese Diet, because
the number of plenary meetings in one session is small. As explained previously,
all bills must pass both chambers before the end of each Diet session. Except for
crucially important issues discussed at the plenary sesisons, deliberations for most
issues are held at committee meetings. In particular, the Committee on the Budget
is used as a substitute for plenary sessions, because the committee has jurisdiction
over every issue related to fiscal expenditures; thus, almost all political issues can be
placed on the agenda.
The second goal for parties in selecting membership of committees is to help
their members get reelected. Legislators pursue several objectives, including reelec-
tion, policy and promotion (Fenno, 1978; Mu¨ller and Strøm, 1999). Among them,
reelection has crucial importance, because winning an election is the prerequisite for
seeking other goals. Parties can help their members to achieve reelection by assigning
them to a committee related to the interests of members’ constituents. Serving as
partners (e.g. Martin and Vanberg, 2005), but this is not the case in Japan.
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a member of a committee closely related their supporters’ interests provides mem-
bers with several opportunities. First, this allows legislators to easily obtain more
information about the policies that are important to their constituents. Second,
committee membership allows legislators to claim credit for legislation passed in the
committee. Third, committee membership gives legislators the opportunity to pro-
mote their policy positions and formally champion legislation that is important to
their constituents (Mayhew, 1974).5 This is particularly important for opposition
party members, because they have limited opportunities to advocate their policy
position and influence government policies. Members of governing parties have the
opportunity to provide their input on policies proposed by the government. For these
reasons, parties are expected to pursue following strategies:
Hypothesis 2.2 Parties assign members to committees that have policy jurisdiction
over issues that are related to their electorates’ interests.
2.3.2 Members Attendance at Committee Meetings
Once appointed to a committee, parties expect legislators to attend committee meet-
ings. To send a bill to the plenary agenda, it is required that a committee first votes
on the bill. Therefore, parties that seek to pass or block legislation want their mem-
bers to show up for meetings. In this respect, there is a significant diﬀerence between
governing and opposition parties. Governing parties with the legislative majority
are able to pass legislation when all members from their party attend the meeting.6
5 A previous analysis shows that the electoral pressure has a substantive impact on the legislators
in pre-electoral sessions (see Fukumoto and Matsuo, 2010).
6 As far as committee membership is allocated proportionally to parties.
29
Therefore, they have stronger needs for members to attend meeting in order to avoid
the roadblock for the schedule in legislation. In particular for the Japanese Diet,
committee rules stipulate that a certain amount of deliberation, which usually re-
quires several committee meetings, must take place before the committee can vote
on a bill. In order to deliberate and vote on a given bill, a quorum requirement to
hold a meeting must be satisfied. Thus, committee attendance is imperative for the
majority party’s success.7
In contrast, opposition parties do not have a strong incentive to make members
attend committee meetings. Even when all opposition members attend committee
meetings, they cannot form a majority in the committee if all governing party mem-
bers are present. Furthermore, even if opposition parties successfully form a majority
for the committee vote and pass a bill that they support, it is likely that the bill will
not pass the plenary vote. Summarizing this discussion, the following hypothesis is
made:
Hypothesis 2.3 Governing party members are more likely to attend committee meet-
ings than opposition members.
There are several factors that may aﬀect the relationship stated in Hypothesis 2.3.
The first is the seniority of members. Parties try to influence their members’ be-
havior in order to achieve the goal that they are pursuing. They can utilize the
7 Governing parties in Japan have successfully cartelized the legislative agenda in the sense
that bills not preferred by a majority of government members are rarely on the agenda (Cox,
Masuyama and McCubbins, 2000). Once government bills are introduced, governing parties
are able to pass the legislation as long as time permits. Usually important bills are submitted
earlier in the session to have it enough time to go through the obstacles.
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resources, such as political funds and political posts under their control, as rewards
and punishments. Junior members are more vulnerable to such pressures, because
they need parties’ help to develop their political career, while senior members are
more independent from the party. The second is individual members’ policy inter-
ests. Some legislators might have an incentive to be absent from meetings, because
time is a precious resource for members; they have to make eﬃcient use of it in order
to achieve the goals that they pursue. Therefore, when they do not have strong
interests in the issues discussed at the committee, they may be less likely to attend.
2.3.3 Temporary Replacement of Committee Members
Recall that there are two types of temporary member replacements: the first satisfies
quorum requirements, while the second makes speeches for particular issues (see
Table 2.2).
With regards to the former, not all parties have the same incentives to satisfy
the quorum requirement. As previously discussed, opposition parties do not have an
incentive to satisfy the quorum requirement, because they cannot form a majority
to pass or block legislation. On the contrary, given that governing parties control
the legislative agenda, they must be careful to satisfy the quorum requirements,
especially during a time of heated interparty confrontation.
In addition, when contentious issues are raising intraparty conflicts, party leader-
ship has an incentive to replace members who do not agree with their policy position
with those who support the leadership’s position. For example, in 2005, the govern-
ing Liberal Democratic Party replaced eight members from the Special Committee
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on Postal Service Privatization when they voted on a bill to privatize the postal
service.8 Given that young members are less likely to break with party rank, party
leadership may prefer to temporarily replace older, more independent members, with
younger, more disciplined members. This argument will be less applicable to commit-
tee replacement patterns by opposition parties, because opposition members votes
are rarely decisive. This leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2.4 Governing parties have a larger number of replacements than op-
position parties, and the replacements are likely junior members of a party.
The second type of temporary replacements are members who deliver speeches in
a committee meeting. These replacements are based on completely diﬀerent moti-
vations from the previous category. Delivering committee speeches is a more salient
activity than just attending a committee meeting; their speeches might impact the
incumbent legislators’ electoral performance. Since the number of committee seats
is fixed, some members are not appointed to their preferred committee. This is
often the case for powerful and prestigious committees such as the Committee on
the Budget, which allocates fiscal resources, and the Agriculture Committee, which
represents rural interests (Horiuchi and Saito, 2003), and has a strong agricultural
lobby (Rosenbluth and Thies, 2010, Chapter 5).
Members can be assigned temporarily to such prestigious committees. Parties
are willing to make these temporary reassignments, because they find it mutually
beneficial. Even an one-time opportunity for serving on a powerful committee pro-
8 Yomiuri Shinbun 06-09-2005
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vides members with an important electoral advantage, which can increase the party’s
chances of winning. Therefore, parties often assign temporary members who antici-
pate a diﬃcult reelection. Since opposition parties do not have access to the resources
of executive division, they utilize this opportunity more often.
Hypothesis 2.5 Opposition members, especially electorally vulnerable members, are
more likely to have the opportunity to deliver speeches in committee meetings as
temporal members.
2.4 Data Description
In order to test the hypotheses stated above, a comprehensive dataset of committee
assignments and membership replacements from 1980 to 2005 was compiled. For
this period, data at ordinary sessions for the Diet were collected, excluding special
and extraordinary sessions, many of which were too short to use as reliable data
sources. To collect committee activity data, all conference minutes of the House
of Representatives were downloaded from the National Diet Library website9 and
parsed using perl scripts. The records of 129th sessions were excluded from the data,
since governing party membership is almost intractable due to multiple changes in
coalition partners during the session.
The unit of observations in the dataset is each member by each legislative ses-
sion. For the period under the current MMM system, I only include the members
who ran for single-member district (SMD) races and exclude members who ran only
9 http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/index.htm
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for proportional representation (PR) races, because the latter members’ reelections
depend little on their personal eﬀorts.10 The present MMM election allows dual
candidacy on both SMD and PR races; PR candidacy is valid only following a loss
in the SMD race. In total, 180 of 480 (67 percent) members are elected from PR
districts, around 80 percent of members held a candidacy in SMD races. After
parsing the information from conference minutes, individual members’ attendances,
speeches, and replacements (resignations and appointments) were counted in each
session. Diﬀerent variables were created for members’ speeches on the day of tempo-
ral appointments. In sum, there are five variables for each committee: the number
of members in attendance, the number of resignations, the number of temporary
members in attendance, the number of speeches and the number of speeches given
by temporary members. These data are used to construct the dependent variables
used in the analysis.11
Though data were collected for all standing committees, a small subset of commit-
tees was shown for the analysis. First, committees that have not been subjected to
jurisdictional changes in this period were selected: Budget, Judicial, Foreign Aﬀairs,
Environment, Agriculture, and Cabinet Committees. Among them, the analysis
focuses on Budget, Agriculture, Foreign Aﬀairs, and Agriculture Committees. As
described previously, the Committee on Budget is particularly important, since it is
one of the fronts for partisan confrontation; the Agriculture Committee is a typical
distributive committee that can easily identify which legislators have higher demand
10 Pekkanen, Nyblade and Krauss (2006) show that the LDP treat PR-only members diﬀerently
from other members.
11 First, committee membership is measured using the criterion described below.
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for becoming a member; Judicial Committee is a committee dominated by experts;
and the Foreign Aﬀairs Committee was another front of partisan confrontation in
the Cold War era, although its importance has been decreasing.
The average number of replacements in each session are shown in Table 2.2. Each
item in the table is the average number of committee activities in one session. The
data are separated into four subcategories depending on governing/opposition status
of parties and pre/post-electoral reform period. For all subcategories, more than 10
percent of members are replaced in each committee meeting, and 20 to 30 percent
are replaced in Budget Committee meetings.
Table 2.3 shows the average member seniority for each activity. Each entry is
the deviation of individual member from the entire mean of committee activities.12
The average seniority for Budget Committee attendants is much higher than that
of other committee attendants. This is probably because more senior members are
likely to be more competent.
The next session analyzes who is appointed to each committee and members’
activities. For this purpose, permanent committee members must be identified; given
the large number of replacements, however, this is diﬃcult. To address this problem,
the number of attendances and resignations are totaled for each Diet member and
considered one as a permanent committee member if the total number of attendances
and resignations is larger than one half of the meetings held in a session.13 There
are four dependent variables in the analysis: permanent committee membership,
12 In other words, the average seniority of total attendance is subtracted from each average.
13 Resignations indicate that she or he holds a membership but did not attend a committee
meeting by being replaced with another member.
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Table 2.2 : Number of Committee Activities Per Session
Committee Type SNTV Gov MMD Gov SNTV Opp MMD Opp
Total Attend 3420.9 5691.4 3219.4 4986.4
Rep-Attend 344.1 772.2 337.8 781.8
Resign 173.6 275.8 156.5 273.9
Speech 138.3 400.3 909.7 1123.4
Rep-Speech 7.5 44.6 98.6 185.0
Budget Attend 632.9 729.4 473.6 613.0
Rep-Attend 126.3 202.0 109.8 240.6
Resign 47.1 38.3 39.1 35.1
Speech 22.0 46.0 88.9 128.2
Rep-Speech 4.6 19.1 34.1 70.2
Judicial Attend 146.3 414.8 144.0 289.1
Rep-Attend 13.3 47.9 11.6 50.7
Resign 8.7 20.1 6.2 20.9
Speech 8.8 34.0 53.2 82.3
Rep-Speech 0.3 2.0 4.0 10.9
Agriculture Attend 298.9 376.6 302.1 371.6
Rep-Attend 20.1 51.2 24.0 37.4
Resign 11.5 23.6 11.2 15.6
Speech 12.0 25.6 103.0 75.3
Rep-Speech 0.1 2.7 6.3 6.1
permanent members’ committee attendance, temporary replacement without speech,
and temporary replacement without speech. The summary statistics are shown in
Table 2.4.
The committee data are then matched with the following variables to be used in
the analysis: degree of urbanization, electoral strength, and seniority. Urbanization
is measured by the proportion of electoral district population who reside in densely
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Table 2.3 : Average Seniority for Each Activities
Committee Type SNTV Gov MMD Gov SNTV Opp MMD Opp
Total Attend 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Rep-Attend −1.133 −0.782 −0.474 −0.459
Resign 1.284 0.760 0.537 0.526
Speech −1.258 −0.582 −0.009 −0.025
Rep-Speech −0.257 −0.482 0.135 −0.126
Budget Attend 2.086 1.924 0.958 0.427
Rep-Attend −0.233 0.153 −0.027 −0.077
Resign 3.068 3.231 1.012 0.591
Speech 0.767 0.862 1.089 0.329
Rep-Speech 0.272 0.040 0.531 0.305
Judicial Attend 0.546 0.269 0.531 0.130
Rep-Attend −1.353 −0.785 −0.423 −0.422
Resign 1.967 1.473 1.219 2.562
Speech −1.511 −0.647 0.361 −0.255
Rep-Speech 0.182 −0.751 0.248 −0.215
Agriculture Attend −0.673 −0.401 −0.538 0.262
Rep-Attend −1.925 −1.164 −0.952 −0.587
Resign 0.190 1.374 −0.219 −0.138
Speech −1.907 −0.918 −0.311 0.229
Rep-Speech −2.018 −1.182 −0.069 −0.223
Each number indicates the diversion of average seniority for each activity from average for total
attend
inhabited districts; electoral strength is measured as divergence from Droop quota14
and seniority as the number of terms served as a member of the House of Represen-
14 Droop quota indicates the proportion of votes suﬃcient to win a seat given district magnitude.
The formula is
vi − qj
qj
where qj =
1
dj + 1
vi is proportion of candidate i obtained in the previous election, qj is Droop quota ratio for
district j, dj is district magnitude for district j. For more detailed discussion, see Cox and
Rosenbluth (1993).
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Table 2.4 : Summary Statistics of Dependent Variables
Variable Elec. Sys Mean Std Dev Min Max
Member Selection
Budget SNTV 0.112 0.315 0 1
SMD 0.118 0.322 0 1
Agriculture SNTV 0.086 0.281 0 1
SMD 0.089 0.285 0 1
Foreign SNTV 0.06 0.238 0 1
SMD 0.067 0.25 0 1
Judicial SNTV 0.052 0.223 0 1
SMD 0.072 0.259 0 1
Number of Attendances
Budget SNTV 19.5 5.636 2 33
SMD 21.98 6.383 9 37
Agriculture SNTV 15.2 5.581 0 29
SMD 18.09 4.784 2 26
Foreign SNTV 11.22 5.27 0 24
SMD 16.01 5.371 4 28
Judicial SNTV 11.34 5.636 0 29
SMD 21.61 7.3 0 35
Replacements without Speech
Budget SNTV 0.331 0.957 0 12
SMD 0.531 1.259 0 13
Agriculture SNTV 0.069 0.317 0 5
SMD 0.16 0.526 0 6
Foreign SNTV 0.04 0.236 0 4
SMD 0.09 0.361 0 6
Judicial SNTV 0.041 0.263 0 6
SMD 0.162 0.569 0 11
Replacements with Speech
Budget SNTV 0.097 0.363 0 5
SMD 0.223 0.62 0 6
Agriculture SNTV 0.013 0.143 0 4
SMD 0.02 0.178 0 4
Foreign SNTV 0.014 0.142 0 3
SMD 0.019 0.167 0 4
Judicial SNTV 0.008 0.1 0 4
SMD 0.027 0.187 0 3
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tatives. In order to capture the eﬀects of expertise on committee activities, a dummy
variable is included for lawyers in the models of the Judicial Committee; it equals
one when a member has a career in the legal profession. Summary statistics for these
variables are shown in Table 2.5.
Table 2.5 : Summary Statistics of Independent Variables
Variable Name Mean Minimum Max Std Dev
Urban 0.583 0.080 1.000 0.278
Margin −0.054 −0.882 1.800 0.225
Seniority 4.516 1 20 3.318
Governing Party 0.511 0 1
Lawyer 0.059 0 1
2.5 Analysis
The empirical tests first explore factors that explain committee membership and at-
tendance. The set of explanatory variables is common to both analyses: seniority,
degree of urbanization, electoral strength. Since the eﬀects of these variables are
considered diﬀerent between governing and opposition parties, models are estimated
in which all explanatory variables interact with the governing party dummy. In order
to allow for easy interpretations of coeﬃcients, interaction terms are included with
the opposition party dummy, and constructive terms are excluded.15 I separate sam-
15 Mathematically, the estimates of the models in this section are the same as those with interac-
tions with governing party and constructive terms. The constructive term estimates and their
standard errors can be calculated as linear combinations of estimates from our specification.
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ples based on electoral systems, SNTV, and SMD to address potential heterogeneity
issues of samples.
2.5.1 Committee Member Selections
Table 2.6 sthe results of logistic regressions in which the dependent variables are
the memberships of each committee. Figure 2.4 shows the predicted probability of
member assignments to each committee given party aﬃliation and seniority.16 Black
dots correspond with predictions for governing parties; white dots, opposition parties.
Squares represent members under the old electoral systems; circles, under the new
electoral system.
As expected by Hypothesis 2.1, memberships in the Committee on the Budget
are more likely to be held by those with higher seniority. In contrast, membership
in other committees cannot be explained by seniority. For both the governing and
the opposition parties, seniority has a negative impact in the case of Agricultural
Committee. As Hypothesis 2.2 predicts, the committee is filled with high-demand
members who are representatives of rural areas. In addition, members of the Agri-
cultural Committee tend to be electorally weak and with lower seniority for both
governing and opposition party members. As for the Judicial Committee, electoral
concerns do not seem to be important in selecting committee members. The Judi-
cial Committee is a typical non-partisan committee with little relations with district
16 The predictions implemented in R are obtained using a simulation-based method introduced in
King, Tomz and Wittenberg (2000) Other prediction in the later subsections are also obtained
in the same manner.
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Table 2.6 : Committee Member Selection Regression
Budget Agriculture Foreign Judicial
SNTV SMD SNTV SMD SNTV SMD SNTV SMD
Governing Party
Urban 0.364 0.478 −1.713∗ −3.855∗ 1.150∗ 0.263 0.738∗ 1.898∗
(0.226) (0.382) (0.313) (0.498) (0.281) (0.464) (0.340) (0.456)
Margin −0.174 0.024 −0.924∗ −1.722∗ 1.358∗ −0.143 −0.759 2.075∗
(0.289) (0.462) (0.383) (0.504) (0.327) (0.571) (0.481) (0.532)
Seniority 0.196∗ 0.263∗ −0.161∗ −0.112∗ 0.001 −0.147∗ 0.021 −0.076
(0.015) (0.027) (0.024) (0.041) (0.023) (0.046) (0.025) (0.039)
Lawyer 2.514∗ 1.693∗
(0.208) (0.336)
Party Dummy −0.461 −0.868∗ −1.019∗ −0.142 0.942∗ 1.516∗ 0.138 −0.508
(0.247) (0.396) (0.257) (0.364) (0.332) (0.509) (0.370) (0.485)
Opposition Party
Urban −0.008 0.319 −3.905∗ −3.394∗ 1.368∗ 0.853 −0.176 −0.277
(0.220) (0.323) (0.318) (0.335) (0.287) (0.455) (0.335) (0.433)
Margin 0.218 −0.334 −0.985∗ −0.362 0.205 0.086 −1.688∗ −0.288
(0.339) (0.356) (0.406) (0.401) (0.430) (0.482) (0.566) (0.497)
Seniority 0.118∗ 0.082∗ −0.170∗ −0.077 0.128∗ 0.093∗ 0.017 −0.079
(0.021) (0.032) (0.029) (0.044) (0.026) (0.041) (0.034) (0.057)
Lawyer 3.234∗ 2.375∗
(0.187) (0.253)
Constant −2.742∗ −2.634∗ 0.145 0.021 −4.263∗ −3.676∗ −3.824∗ −2.783∗
(0.177) (0.280) (0.182) (0.244) (0.251) (0.399) (0.270) (0.364)
Observations 6360 2884 6360 2884 6360 2884 6156 2863
Log Likelihood −2114.9 −989.7 −1697.9 −771.6 −1403.7 −695.4 −1056.8 −680.8
χ2: Model 2565.3 1152.2 2310.8 1038.2 2575.1 1206.0 2058.1 1109.4
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
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Figure 2.4 : Prediction: Assignment to Committees
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interests.17 Although I do not present the empirical results, the same relationship
exists in the case of the Health, Labour and Welfare Committee, where medical doc-
tors are overrepresented. Overall, these findings for Agricultural Committee support
the hypotheses presented in Section 2.3.
2.5.2 Committee Attendances
This section investigates committee activities by formal members of the committees
previously identified. Binomial regressions with logistic link are used for the analysis
of committee attendance.18 The number of Bernoulli trials are the total number
of meetings for the respective committees in each session; the number of success is
the number of committee attendance by the member. Estimates are shown in Table
2.7. Hypothesis 2.3 predicts that committee members from governing parties are
more likely to attend committee meetings. Since models are used with interaction
terms, the estimated coeﬃcient of constructive terms cannot be interpreted by itself,
especially when other variables are not normalized. As a result, the substantive
impact is calculated by simulation and presented in Figure 2.5. Budget Committee
members from the governing party are more likely to attend committee meetings
than opposition members, especially when members have low seniority.
However, members with higher seniority are less likely to show up for committee
meetings. This indicates that members attend committee meetings to show their
17 As the authors show in a diﬀerent paper (Matsumoto and Matsuo, 2010), discussions in the
Judicial Committee are dominated by legal professionals.
18 This specification is the same as running logistic regressions with each members atten-
dance/absence as a unit of observation.
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Table 2.7 : Binomial Regressions of Attendance for Committee Members
Budget Agriculture Foreign Judicial
SNTV SMD SNTV SMD SNTV SMD SNTV SMD
Governing Party
Urban 0.277∗ −0.259 −0.185 −1.574∗ −0.168 0.590 −0.248 1.059∗
(0.128) (0.214) (0.233) (0.319) (0.162) (0.325) (0.258) (0.249)
Margin −1.117∗ −0.700∗ −0.620∗ 0.430 −1.083∗ 1.477∗ −0.746∗ 0.070
(0.156) (0.258) (0.227) (0.293) (0.231) (0.414) (0.291) (0.281)
Seniority −0.034∗ −0.112∗ −0.122∗ −0.238∗ −0.104∗ −0.088∗ −0.088∗ −0.116∗
(0.013) (0.019) (0.013) (0.020) (0.012) (0.035) (0.013) (0.018)
Lawyer 0.578∗ 0.977∗
(0.138) (0.221)
Party Dummy −0.369∗ 1.009∗ 0.360∗ 0.489 0.365 −0.326 0.937∗ 0.107
(0.162) (0.258) (0.158) (0.250) (0.225) (0.378) (0.257) (0.273)
Opposition Party
Urban −0.511∗ 0.167 0.325 −0.136 0.177 −0.074 0.450∗ −0.088
(0.128) (0.185) (0.201) (0.274) (0.201) (0.376) (0.218) (0.225)
Margin 0.634∗ 0.629∗ 0.332 −0.514 −0.307 −0.291 −1.759∗ −2.404∗
(0.194) (0.208) (0.236) (0.359) (0.204) (0.306) (0.388) (0.290)
Seniority −0.044∗ 0.028 −0.036∗ −0.117∗ −0.055∗ −0.075∗ −0.004 −0.035
(0.013) (0.020) (0.016) (0.026) (0.015) (0.028) (0.018) (0.028)
Lawyer 0.607∗ −0.491∗
(0.116) (0.129)
Constant 2.310∗ 1.987∗ 1.731∗ 2.699∗ 1.532∗ 2.266∗ 0.905∗ 1.632∗
(0.116) (0.186) (0.097) (0.176) (0.180) (0.299) (0.163) (0.202)
Observations 709 339 549 258 382 193 322 207
Log Likelihood −2191.4 −873.5 −1365.6 −607.4 −892.1 −458.3 −750.0 −641.0
χ2: Model 6278.1 3525.3 3628.7 2087.5 1564.1 1444.8 1469.9 1939.0
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
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Figure 2.5 : Prediction: Members Attendance Rates
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loyalty to their party. Members with lower seniority have larger expectation for
distribution of political resources controlled by party caucuses, such as subsidies
to political parties19 and assignment to important political oﬃces (Nemoto, Krauss
and Pekkanen, 2008), and tend to show greater party loyalty. There are substantial
variations across committees. For the Committee on Agriculture, governing party
members are less likely to attend committee meetings under the SNTV system. Most
of the issues on the committee agenda are not accompanied by strong partisan di-
vides, but all members are either agreeable or opposed to the government policy20;
therefore, governing parties do not have to push their member to attend the meeting.
2.5.3 Committee Member Replacements
As discussed, there are two separate categories in committee member replacements
led by diﬀerent motivations. Table 2.8 shows the results for member replacements
who do not make speeches. The dependent variable is the number of times that a
house member attends meetings of each committee in a session. Since the dependent
variable is a count variable, negative binomial regressions are used to deal with the
issue of over-dispersion (King, 1998).21 Many of governing party dummy variables
19 The Party Subsidy Law stipulates that parties with more than five Diet members are subsidized
by about sixty million yen per member every year.
20 The typical example is whether to liberalize the market of rice and accept imports, which was
the most contentious issue in the agricultural policy in the 1980s and 1990s. Protecting the
agricultural sector was important for a large number of members of the House of Representa-
tives (Rosenbluth and Thies, 2010).
21 Strictly speaking, the dependent variable is not a count variable, because the variable is up-
wardly bounded by the number of meeting in each session. However, this does not pose a
serious issue, because the maximum numbers for dependent variables are far from the bound
(see Table 2.4). Addressing the over-dispersion is more important. As Table 2.8 indicates,
dependent variables are over-dispersed (see the χ2 statistics for α). I use Stata for estimating
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are positive, which suggests that the main reason to fill absent members’ vacancy
is to satisfy the quorum requirements and hence evade a roadblock in committee
deliberation (i.e. Hypotheses 2.4). To determine if this is the case, the predicted
numbers of committee meeting attendances are plotted as a temporal member.
The prediction plots basically conform with Hypotheses 2.4: for all committees,
members from governing parties have a higher predicted count of attending as tem-
poral members, but temporal replacements are mainly observed for members with
low seniority and very few senior members serve as temporal members.
The second category of temporary replacements includes those who make speeches.
The suggested motivation for such replacements is to give members a credit-claiming
opportunity. The estimates of models are shown in Table 2.9. The model specifi-
cation is the same as in the previous analysis. For prediction, electoral strength is
used as a variable to investigate the eﬀects on the number of replacements (Figure
2.7), because electoral strength is the variable of interest in Hypothesis 2.5. The
empirical distribution of the variable in order to choose the value for predictions,
and the first to the third quantile of the variable is selected. The results partially
support the hypothesis: for most committees under both electoral systems, opposi-
tion party members have a greater chance to deliver speech as a temporal member;
in some cases, however, the diﬀerences between governing and opposition parties are
not significant at the 95% confidence level.
negative binomial regression models. The model specification is an exponential link to mean
parameter λ with over-dispersion parameter α.
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Table 2.8 : Negative Binomial Regressions for Committee Member Replacements
without Speech
Budget Agriculture Foreign Judicial
SNTV SMD SNTV SMD SNTV SMD SNTV SMD
Governing Party
Urban 0.143 0.128 −0.401 −0.796∗ 0.746 0.049 0.387 −0.476
(0.209) (0.285) (0.344) (0.364) (0.408) (0.447) (0.421) (0.457)
Margin −0.268 −0.368 −0.374 −0.405 −0.845 −0.208 −1.732∗ −0.322
(0.291) (0.366) (0.484) (0.449) (0.615) (0.577) (0.668) (0.583)
Seniority −0.472∗ −1.010∗ −0.674∗ −0.875∗ −0.452∗ −0.932∗ −0.569∗ −0.552∗
(0.028) (0.072) (0.060) (0.085) (0.059) (0.118) (0.066) (0.072)
Lawyer 0.631 −0.433
(0.513) (0.729)
Party Dummy 1.742∗ 0.995∗ 0.602 0.930∗ 0.961∗ 1.388∗ 0.665 0.311
(0.200) (0.279) (0.331) (0.391) (0.429) (0.484) (0.466) (0.423)
Opposition Party
Urban 0.774∗ −0.126 −1.641∗ −0.985∗ 0.340 0.193 −0.453 −0.187
(0.182) (0.216) (0.332) (0.330) (0.404) (0.411) (0.473) (0.335)
Margin −1.566∗ −0.071 −0.982 0.385 0.319 1.125∗ −1.168 0.496
(0.304) (0.248) (0.537) (0.403) (0.617) (0.517) (0.791) (0.427)
Seniority −0.210∗ −0.523∗ −0.353∗ −0.630∗ −0.230∗ −0.484∗ −0.519∗ −0.572∗
(0.022) (0.047) (0.047) (0.090) (0.053) (0.098) (0.087) (0.081)
Lawyer 1.047∗ −0.715
(0.408) (0.576)
Constant −1.311∗ 0.402∗ −0.937∗ −0.038 −2.911∗ −1.519∗ −2.131∗ −0.379
(0.141) (0.178) (0.238) (0.278) (0.314) (0.352) (0.364) (0.285)
ln(α) 1.074 0.458 0.912 0.332 1.599 0.373 1.584 1.155
(0.065) (0.091) (0.180) (0.186) (0.216) (0.278) (0.194) (0.138)
α 2.926 1.581 2.489 1.394 4.949 1.452 4.876 3.174
χ2: α 1173.059 503.975 86.705 76.052 78.081 31.043 110.820 206.469
Observations 5651 2545 5811 2626 5978 2691 5834 2656
Log Likelihood −3625.2 −2066.4 −1255.0 −1014.7 −920.7 −716.4 −842.8 −1092.4
χ2: Model 1334.2 474.9 1696.1 803.8 1694.9 887.8 1370.6 750.3
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
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Figure 2.6 : Prediction: Attending Committee Meetings as Replaced Member with-
out Speech
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Table 2.9 : Negative Binomial Regressions for Committee Member Replacements
with Speech
Budget Agriculture Foreign Judicial
SNTV SMD SNTV SMD SNTV SMD SNTV SMD
Governing Party
Urban 0.699 1.168∗ −0.567 −1.171 14.025 −11.159 0.765 6.441
(0.565) (0.580) (4.339) (2.724) (19.514) (13.378) (1.722) (4.082)
Margin −0.209 1.537∗ −7.336 1.928 4.568 1.301 1.968 4.804
(0.793) (0.670) (7.929) (2.965) (4.207) (4.315) (1.589) (3.677)
Seniority −0.029 −0.009 −0.468 −1.850 −0.015 −0.647 −0.098 −0.470
(0.048) (0.048) (0.682) (1.066) (0.396) (0.903) (0.159) (0.377)
Lawyer 2.241 4.365∗
(1.150) (2.003)
Party Dummy −1.424∗ −1.569∗ −5.433 −0.122 −16.158 3.428 −1.448 −5.972
(0.443) (0.455) (3.239) (2.062) (19.090) (3.700) (1.383) (3.070)
Opposition Party
Urban 1.400∗ 0.638∗ −3.874∗ −2.321∗ 0.439 2.118∗ 0.883 1.440∗
(0.191) (0.226) (0.661) (0.627) (0.491) (0.851) (0.623) (0.621)
Margin −0.112 −1.532∗ −2.352∗ −0.409 0.133 −2.831∗ −3.187∗ 0.761
(0.298) (0.228) (0.941) (0.745) (0.794) (0.697) (1.150) (0.676)
Seniority 0.018 0.000 −0.098 −0.170 0.004 −0.126 −0.109 −0.316∗
(0.019) (0.027) (0.059) (0.101) (0.050) (0.101) (0.071) (0.101)
Lawyer 2.134∗ 1.792∗
(0.380) (0.425)
Constant −2.822∗ −1.924∗ −1.542∗ −1.456∗ −3.891∗ −5.732∗ −5.125∗ −3.428∗
(0.160) (0.200) (0.419) (0.521) (0.388) (0.796) (0.534) (0.531)
ln(α) 0.365 0.275 2.472 2.349 2.830 1.708 1.022 1.470
(0.188) (0.160) (0.326) (0.410) (0.302) (0.480) (0.813) (0.429)
α 1.440 1.317 11.849 10.477 16.945 5.520 2.777 4.348
χ2: α 63.732 102.016 52.087 34.031 60.566 18.582 5.210 17.451
Observations 5651 2545 5811 2626 5978 2691 5834 2656
Log Likelihood −1644.1 −1303.6 −314.4 −210.0 −379.1 −196.0 −235.0 −272.5
χ2: Model 2008.2 869.0 662.3 429.0 784.1 404.8 793.4 526.2
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
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Figure 2.7 : Prediction: Attending Committee Meetings as Replaced Member with
Speech
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2.6 Conclusion
This chapter explored how parties in the Japanese Diet use standing committee
appointments and activities to achieve their legislative and electoral goals. For im-
portant committees where parties need to advance the partisan agenda, parties send
more competent members who can deliver messages more eﬀectively. In contrast,
for committees which serve members’ needs for distribution, parties are likely to
assign members with strong interests in a district or who are electorally vulnera-
ble. After making the assignment, members from governing and opposition parties
exhibit diﬀerent patterns in attendance and committee speeches. Members from
governing parties, whose primary goal in a committee deliberations is to send bills
to the plenary agenda on schedule, are more likely to attend committee meetings
than opposition party members. Finally, the governing and opposition parties both
take advantage of their ability to assign an unlimited number of temporary commit-
tee replacements, but each utilizes this rule for diﬀerent purposes. The governing
parties exploit this institution to send junior members to attend committee meet-
ings that may otherwise fall short of the quorum requirement, hence maximizing the
probability of passing legislation. Opposition parties, on the other hand, use tempo-
rary member replacements to advance policy debates and provide members with the
chance to give speeches, creating credit-claiming opportunities.
Committees in legislatures, which consist of a small subset of its members, can be
seen from three general perspectives: (a) arena for high demanders; (b) an eﬃcient
mode to manage information; and (c) extensions of majority parties (Mattson and
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Strøm, 1995). This categorization comes from the literature of the US Congress.
Applying this to other countries or other entities (i.e. state government in the US)
is one of the developing areas in comparative legislative studies. This research is a
such attempt. It shows the diﬀerent motivations to use committees for governing
and opposition parties as a logical consequence of the parliamentary system. High
demanders and experts are selected to relevant committees as active members as a
consequence of personal vote incentives created by majoritarian electoral systems.
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Chapter 3
Incentive for Pork-Barrel Spending Under
Mixed-Membered System in Japan
Chapter Abstract
By examining who received the distribution of targetable goods, the literature has
tried to determine whom legislators and parties represent. Some scholars argue that
legislators and parties pay special attention to their core supporters, while others
argue that they just seek votes with larger impacts on electoral outcomes at smaller
expenses. Recent studies have shown that their strategic calculations and decisions
are intervened by electoral institutions and party organizations. This chapter sheds
new light on this research agenda by investigating mixed member systems in Japan,
using fiscal transfer data from the parallel system in Japan to investigate the distri-
bution of government funds. The empirical results show that the governing parties
dominate this domain. They funnel fiscal transfers to districts that provide strong
support for the party. Individual candidates do not have suﬃcient control over re-
sources to galvanize a personal vote by rewarding supporters, but influential members
of the governing parties can provide goods to their core supporters.
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3.1 Introduction
In the literature of particularistic spending, scholars have attempted to determine
who receives the distribution of targetable goods. Political parties who are in control
of spending decisions have an incentive to use these resources for their electoral bene-
fits. Parties want to reward their current supporters and make an eﬀort to secure the
support in future elections from current or potential supporters. Theoretical debates
have focused on who will be the likely recipients of such spendings: core-supporters of
parties or swing supporters (Cox and McCubbins, 1986; Dixit and Londregan, 1996).
Recently, there has been renewed interest in the strength of parties, especially in elec-
tions, as a determinant of government spending (Golden and Picci, 2008; Primo and
Snyder Jr., 2010).). Empirical evidence has been accumulated from countries around
the world such as Albania (Case, 2001), Japan (Hirano, 2011), Portugal (Veiga and
Veiga, Forthcoming 2012), and Sweden (Dahlberg and Johansson, 2002) to name a
few.
This chapter investigates this research question through a study of fiscal transfer
from national to local governments under a mixed member system. Two specific
questions are addressed. The first is how the distribution of particularistic goods
works under mixed systems, where electorates have two votes. Mixed member sys-
tems are one of the most popular electoral systems.1 In most chambers with mixed
systems, the electoral system consists of two-tiers of single member districts (SMD)
1 According to the Inter-Parliament Union website, forty four chambers in forty three countries
are listed as the mixed systems. (http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp, ac-
cessed on February 25, 2012.)
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and proportional representation (PR).2 There are two major variations of mixed-
member systems: mixed-member proportional (MMP) and mixed-member majori-
tarian (MMM).
This study focuses on MMM systems, in which the election outcomes are de-
termined by two separate votes. Although a number of studies have explored the
determinant of particularistic spending, only a few studies explicitly take into ac-
count the characteristics of the MMM system. In MMM systems, electorates have
two votes that are used independently from each other in calculating seats; therefore,
electoral support for parties and candidates are separated on the ballot and therefore
can be observed independently from each other. This study seeks to determine to
which type of support are parties more responsive.
More broadly, this chapter investigats how parties create strategies to obtain and
sustain support from their constituents. Except for the closed-list PR systems, elec-
tion outcomes in any electoral systems are the functions of personal and party votes
(Carey and Shugart, 1995). For instance, the national swings of party votes in the
US have altered the majority parties of the Congress, although the US Congressional
electoral system is considered to emphasize personal vote incentives. In contrast, even
in the elections for the British House of Commons, personal traits have shown to be
influential to election outcomes (Wood and Norton, 1992). In these two examples,
elections are held with pure-SMD plurality rules; therefore, political actors as well as
researchers can only observe the votes cast for individual candidates and must rely
on this information when they make electorally motivated policy decisions. However,
2 Shugart and Wattenberg (2001b)provide a detailed description of each countrys system.
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voters’ evaluations of candidates can be diﬀerent from that of parties. Accordingly,
responses by the parties might be diﬀerent as well. In other words, parties might be
responding only to personal votes but not to party votes, or vice versa. By treating
these two types of votes separately, this research can provide a novel insight on the
parties’ response to constituent support.
I investigate these questions using data of fiscal transfers in Japan during the early
years after the electoral reform in 1996 from a single non-transferable vote (SNTV)
system to a MMM system.3 The new electoral system provides two conditions to
create a suitable environment for testing the argument. The first is the direct output
of MMM system: electorates have two ballots, each of which represents personal or
party votes separately. The PR-portion ballots are mostly cast for partisan motiva-
tion, while plurality ballots are the combination of partisan and candidate-oriented.
The second is the significant eﬀect of personal votes. The new electoral system is
certainly more party oriented, and personal votes’ aspects are less salient. However,
as Scheiner (2007) argues, due to the strong tradition of SNTV, voting behaviors are
still heavily influenced by personalized motivation.4 The combination of these two
factors allows the test of how parties and members respond to these personal and
partisan votes by allocating particularistic spendings.
This chapter proceeds as follows. The next section provides a brief overview
of the current electoral system and recent elections of the Japanese House of Rep-
3 The new systems is also called a mixed-member plurality system (e.g. Krauss and Pekkanen,
2010), but I use the term, MMM system, which is one of two subcategories of mixed-member
systems defined in Shugart and Wattenberg (2001b).
4 See also Moser and Scheiner (2004) and Scheiner (2008).
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resentatives. The third section presents the theoretical framework and hypothesis,
followed by a description of the dataset used in this chapter. The fifth section shows
the result of empirical analysis at two diﬀerent levels. The last section concludes
with a broader discussion about the relations between elections and particularistic
goods spending.
3.2 The Japanese Context After Electoral Reform
Until its monumental fall in the 2008 general election, the Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP) in Japan had been the dominant party for more than a half century. The LDP
hegemony was stable and strong during most of the period under SNTV. Numerous
academic and journalistic articles have argued that the LDP created the system
of clientelistic network, which helped them to maintain the dominant party status
through a large flow of fiscal transfer to the national to the local governments d (e.g.
Hirose, 1993; Scheiner, 2006; Saito, 2006).
As Carey and Shugart (1995) argue, SNTV is one of the electoral systems that
gives strong incentive to cultivate personal votes. Under SNTV, party labels are
not an eﬀective tool to procure votes, since candidates from large parties have to
compete with their co-partisans. This personal vote cultivation incentive was par-
ticularly strong for the LDP members, because the LDP was the only party which
had to field multiple candidates in electoral districts with an average magnitude of
four in pursuit of securing the majority of the chamber. To cultivate personal votes,
the LDP incumbents had to coordinate and divide votes across candidates in the
same district by building a coalition of a portion of electorates (McCubbins and
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Rosenbluth, 1995), acquiring policy expertise in the area diﬀerent from co-partisans
(Tatebayashi and McKean, 2002) and building clientelistic networks of local politi-
cians and constituents (Scheiner, 2006). The LDP could have established a centrally
controlled system of distributing benefits, but the party instead limited their role
to coordinating incumbents’ interests by establishing institutions to enhance sta-
ble exchanges, such as the Policy Aﬀairs Research Council, to ensure the long-term
exchange between incumbents (McCubbins and Rosenbluth, 1995).
The situation changed drastically after the electoral reform. In 1994, the Japanese
Diet passed an electoral reform to repeal the SNTV system and install the parallel
MMM system, which consists of 300 seats from single member districts with plurality
formula and 200 proportional representation seats from 11 districts. Under the MMM
electoral system in Japan, electorates have two votes which they cast for PR and
SMD tiers. These two votes are counted separately and there is no compensation
mechanism between two tiers. Therefore, seat-vote disproportionality created by
the SMD portion is not moderated by the PR portion, which is the case for MMP
systems, such as Germany and New Zealand.
The electoral system alteration has significantly reduced incentives to cultivate
personal votes. Personal vote incentives under SNTV resulted mostly from the intra-
party competition, which is almost non-existent under the MMM system. The MMM
system has an indirect mechanism of intraparty competition through the best-loser
rule. Under this rule, candidates can have dual-candidacy for both SMD and PR;
their candidacy is only considered in the latter when they lose in the former. Parties
can place multiple candidates at the same rank in PR, and seats are given to can-
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didate with higher proportion of SMD votes to the winner of their SMDs; therefore,
SMD candidates have to lose by a narrower margin than their copartisans. However,
this does not give them a strong incentive to personalize their campaign strategies
because SMD losers’ fates are determined by their SMD competitions where no co-
partisans are running against.
Additional evidence of declining personal vote incentives can be found in the
membership of Koenkai, a local support group for individual candidates. In the pre-
electoral reform period, LDP candidates organized and mobilized Koenkai. Krauss
and Pekkanen (2010) point out that the Koenkai membership was at its peak from
the 1970s to 1990s and has been in a steady decline after the electoral reform. Since
Koenkai is primarily an organization which delivers supports for a candidates by
enhancing and sustaining personal ties between a politician and his supporters, not
necessarily by utilizing particularistic benefits to their supporters (Krauss and Pekka-
nen, 2010, 31), the decline itself is not direct evidence of the declining pork-barrel
spending. However, this implies that cultivating personal votes is a less attractive
strategy for candidates.
The decline of personal vote incentives does not necessarily mean that they have
disappeared from House members’ electoral strategies. The proportion of Koenkai
members among electorates in 2003 was still as high as in the 1970s (Krauss and
Pekkanen, 2010). Its resilience can be attributed to historical factors and comple-
mentary institutions related to campaigning. This strategy, which was eﬀective in
the past, might be one of the few options that incumbents have under very restrictive
campaign regulations.
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This persistence of personal-vote seeking behavior is simply shown by the fact
that there is a large diﬀerence between the votes cast for the ruling LDP in SMDs
and PR. Figure 3.1 shows the proportion of LDP votes in SMDs and PR at the local
level in the first two general elections for the House of Representatives after the elec-
toral reform. The diﬀerence is the aggregated outcomes of the split ticketing; that
is, electorates cast votes for diﬀerent parties for SMD and PR. There are at least
two possible reasons for this split ticketing: strategic voting by electorates who con-
sider the viability of candidates in plurality election and the personal votes.5 Since
plurality systems provide the strong incentive to vote strategically, the literature on
mixed member systems has been placing the stronger emphasis on the strategic vot-
ing (e.g. Cox and Schoppa, 2002; Gschwend, 2007). In contrast, Moser and Scheiner
(2004) argue that the personal-vote seeking strategy to raise votes is viable under
the Japanese context. The Japan’s MMM system puts stronger emphasis on the
SMD portion, because a larger proportion of seats are selected from this portion;
moreover, there is no linkage between the two portions to ensure proportional elec-
toral outcomes. In addition, especially for the early post-reform period studied in
this research, the prior electoral system has had residual influence on the candidates’
behavior.6
5 Another possibility is the diﬀerent choice sets in SMDs and PR. Voters might not have the
option to vote for some parties in SMD election, if a party refrains from fielding candidates.
This might be particularly problematic considering the electoral cooperation between the LDP
and New Komeito since the 2000 general election (“Vote for me in SMD, but vote for Komeito
in PR” campaign by LDP candidates). However, the dispersion of the SMD-PR diﬀerence is
almost identical for the 1996 and 2000 elections, which implies that the diﬀerence is not the
result of electoral cooperation.
6 See also McKean and Scheiner (2000).
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without an LDP candidate are excluded.
Figure 3.1 : Proportion of the LDP Votes at Local Level
It is clear that competing motivations are present under the MMM system, es-
pecially the Japanese one. This provides an excellent context to study how parties’
interest in distribution of particularistic goods depends on diﬀerent electoral incen-
tives.
3.3 Literature and Theory
Who is buying what from whom? This is the question addressed in research on elec-
toral incentives to distribute targetable goods. Political actors attempt to improve
their prospects by eﬀectively delivering the resources which they can allocate discre-
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tionarily. Two influential formal models provide diﬀerent answers to these question.7
A formal model proposed by Cox and McCubbins (1986) shows that, among three
groups of electorates – core support groups, opposition groups, and swing voters –
actors seek core support groups. For risk-averse actors, core supporters are a more
reliable target of investments, as they have more information about this group; there-
fore, investment is economically eﬃcient. In contrast, Lindbeck and Weibull (1987)
model shows diﬀerent results.8 Their model assumes that political actors want to
maximize the votes through targetable goods allocation. For that purpose, their
target is the vote that they can buy with smaller costs. This implies that political
actors attempt to acquire votes from swing voters who do not have strong support
for any actors.
These two models consider the situation in which political actors and voters are
exchanging targetable benefits and votes. However, there are several weak linkages
to connect allocations and votes in these arguments (Cox, 2009); These weak linkages
create a renewed research attention to the topic of targetable goods allocation. The
first is the lack of institutional arguments. These models assume that the electoral
system is majoritarian: two parties compete with each other, and both pursue the
electoral victory in a single electoral district where obtaining the majority of votes
is required to secure the win. Most legislative elections create more than one winner
across multiple districts with magnitude larger than one. As Cox (2009) points out,
empirical works on this subject are divided into studies that support core supporter
7 See also Cox (2009).
8 See also and Dixit and Londregan (1996), who provide general model support for the swing
voter model.
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and swing voter theories.
These mixed findings may result from lack of consideration of institutional ar-
rangement (Golden and Picci, 2008). Institutions change the incentive structure that
determines who has the largest concern for bringing the benefit to their strongholds
and who controls the decision making power for allocating targetable goods. The
literature particularly focuses on two factors. The first is the electoral system, which
determines to what degree individual candidates’ strategies matter for electoral suc-
cess. As seen in the previous section, some electoral systems create a situation where
personal vote incentive is almost negligible. The most extreme case is the PR, in
which candidates’ eﬀorts do not count much in determining their fates. The oppo-
site case is single member districts in which electorates have more information on
individual candidates, and this information plays a role in voters’ decision-making.
The MMM system in Japan is a mixture of two systems which have opposite
characteristics. The SMD tier still gives strong motivation to cultivate personal
votes, although it is weaker than the SNTV system. In contrast, the PR tier does
not have such eﬀects. Although the PR tier has the “best loser” rule, this does not
give additional incentive to cultivate personal votes. In their analysis of committee
assignments for LDP members, Pekkanen, Nyblade and Krauss (2006) argue that
legislators who earned a seat as a best-loser should get preferable allocation of dis-
tributive posts, because these legislators are electorally vulnerable. Helping them to
improve their electoral prospects in the SMD election will be a rewarding strategy
for the party.
Parties and individual members might have potentially conflicting incentives.
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Given that the largest electoral concern for an individual member is to secure re-
election, incumbents’ personal eﬀorts under SMD would help them to achieve this
goal. However, the resources available in the legislature and in the government in
general are limited in many aspects. For instance, in the legislature, there are limited
committee seats and plenary time; therefore, time for deliberation and the number of
bills considered on the floor are severely restricted (Cox, 2006). As a result, members
need a coordination mechanism. In many states, political parties take charge of this
coordination as intensively discussed in the literature on the US Congress.
It is obvious that the fiscal resource of the government is another example of
such limited resources. In the study of US Congress, credit-claiming through pork-
distribution is considered as one of the most important sources for personal vote
cultivation (Mayhew, 1974). This type of mechanism has been found in studies of
other countries (e.g. Stratmann and Baur, 2002; Denemark, 2000; Case, 2001). Japan
is not an exception, at least before electoral reform (Hirose, 1993; Scheiner, 2005).
Given the importance of pork-barrel politics even under the MMM system, what
has to be addressed is whose political supports to whom are rewarded. Table 3.1
shows the prediction used by Golden and Picci (2008). Based on the theoretical
arguments of McGillivray (2004), Golden and Picci argue that electoral systems and
party strengths determine the likely recipients of pork-barrel spending. The logic is
that parties want to invest in marginal districts, because this is the most cost-eﬃcient
way to improve their electoral performance. When parties are strong, they are able
to choose this strategy; when parties are weak, powerful deputies can alter the flow
of money and bring pork to their district, even if this is not an eﬃcient strategy for
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parties as a whole. Note that safe districts receive more government funds because
of the existence of powerful deputies. In other words, safe districts are used as a
proxy for powerful deputies.
Table 3.1 : Theoretical Predictions
Governing Parties
Strong Weak
Electoral System
SMD marginal districts safe districts
open-list PR party strongholds party leader bailiwicks
From Golden and Picci (2008)
There are two possible explanation why strong districts receive a large transfer.
The first possibility is that, as Golden and Picci (2008) stated, powerful legislator
has an influence over the fiscal transfer, and the second possibility is that, parties
care about core-supporters for the party. Therefore, even when parties are strong,
there is a possibility that safe districts are rewarded and there are potentially three
likely recipients of the fiscal transfer under the SMD only system. The first is that
the parties are in charge of the transfer and investing marginal districts, the second
is that the parties are strong but investing safe district, and the third is that the
individual members with a say in the distribution allocates larger transfers. In this
third case, since powerful members are more likely to be strong in election as well,
the outcome may not be observationally indistinguishable from the second case.
In contrast to the complexity of SMD scenarios, the closed-list PR gives a much
simpler story. As shown in Table 3.1, there are two possibilities in regard to the
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open-list PR systems depending on the strength of parties. Under the closed-list
system, the weak party scenario is no longer relevant, because powerful members
of the party would not benefit much from distributing pork to their bailiwicks. In
order to get reelected, they only need to be ranked high in their party lists enough
to secure their seats.
The discussion so far has focused on pure systems with only SMD or closed-list
PR elections. The next issue is how these theoretical expectations are intertwined
under mixed systems. Some of these scenarios are realized depending on two condi-
tions: strength of parties and relative importance of party supports. In the literature,
strength of parties has been considered one of the key factors which determine in-
cumbents’ behavior in the electoral and legislative arena (e.g. Primo and Snyder Jr.,
2010; Tavits, 2009). McGillivray (2004) defines party strength as the degree to which
“the voter is choosing a party with an associated package of policies or the voter is
choosing an individual who will enter the bargaining process to further constituency
interests”(44). When parties are strong, individual legislators’ electoral performances
are closely tied to the parties’ reputation; therefore, legislators may not have strong
incentives to put much eﬀort into improving personal reputation. This consideration
definitely has an influence on members’ interests in pork barrel spending.
The second factor, the importance of party support relative to support for indi-
vidual members, is particularly relevant under mixed electoral systems through the
parties’ emphasis on either electoral support for parties in PR districts or members
in SMD districts. The importance of party support varies across states depending
on several factors. The first is electoral institutions. MMP systems have a com-
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pensatory mechanism that ensures the proportionality of electoral outcomes, and
will enhance the parties’ interests in PR votes. However, even under MMM systems
without compensatory mechanism, a high proportion of PR seats will have similar
eﬀects. Since success in PR districts will determine the entire performance of parties
in elections, parties care more about the election outcomes.
The second element which increases the importance of party support is the
strength of correlations between PR election votes and SMD votes. That is, even
when electoral institutions do not necessarily emphasize the PR portion, strong cor-
relation between the two tiers of an electoral system will lead to stronger party
concerns for votes in PR portion, as far as a party believes that voters’ decision-
making is based on mostly partisanship. Under such conditions, parties have reason
to reward their partisan supporters.
Based on these arguments, the following hypothesis is made:
Hypothesis 3.1 (Governing Parties’ Strategies)
1. The larger the weight of the SMD portion or the more unstable partisan support
for the parties, the more fiscal transfers are influenced by individual members’
electoral performance.
2. The smaller the weight of the SMD portion or the more stable partisan sup-
port for the parties, the more the parties’ bailiwicks are likely to receive larger
allocation of distributive goods.
As to individual members’ influences, the predictions are simple. When individual
members rely on personal votes for reelection, they have reason to put eﬀorts in to
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extract money to their district, especially to groups who exhibit strong support.
Hypothesis 3.2 (Influential Legislators’ Influence) Legislators with strong in-
fluence on intraparty decision-making can direct fiscal resources for their benefit:
1. At the district level, influential members’ districts are likely to receive larger
allocation.
2. Within each district, influential members are more likely to direct resources to
their bailiwicks.
3.4 Data Description
To test the hypotheses provided in the previous section, this research utilizes the
fiscal transfer from central to municipality governments from 1997 to 2002. The
Japanese House of Representatives held its first election under the new electoral
system in 1996. This dataset covers the period immediately following the reform
and runs until the period before the massive wave of municipal mergers in the early
2000s. The central government in Japan introduced policy measures to enhance
mergers in order to improve the eﬃciency of local administration. As a result, the
number of municipalities has declined from 3,200 in 1999 and 1,700 in 2011. A
large number of mergers were held in 2004 when the financial assistance for mergers
expired. Before the mergers, most electoral district boundaries overlapped with
municipality borders. Few municipalities were split in multiple districts, which enable
us to identify incumbent members from the municipalities. As district elections are
held under the first-past-the-post system, parties field only one candidate from their
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party almost without exception. For municipalities that underwent the mergers in
2004, the financial report for fiscal year 2003 were prepared under a new government,
which does not distinguish spending in old municipalities. To keep the empirical
analysis simple, only data before the wave of mergers are used. For both variables,
the natural logarithm to the per capita expenditures is calculated.
3.4.1 Dependent Variables
The main dependent variable is the per capita total transfers to municipality gov-
ernments, which combine both earmarked and non-earmarked lump-sum transfers.
The former is distributed based on fiscal programs taken up by local governments.
The major items in earmarked spending are public constructions projects and ed-
ucation spending. Both types of transfers are considered, because in the Japanese
case, it is diﬃcult to see whether some spending is an automatic transfer or arbitrary
distribution with political intentions.
Per capita spending on public constructions works is used as further evidence to
support the result from the main analysis, which uses total transfers. This anal-
ysis uses ordinary construction work expenditures of municipalities, which include
all necessary expenditures to implement new construction projects for social capital
improvement such as road, bridges, school buildings, and public parks. Among de-
veloped countries, Japan ranks high in such social capital development investments,
and a large portion of spending had been implemented by the local government with
the funds transferred from the central government. In the Japanese fiscal system, lo-
cal governments, especially financially weak ones, rely heavily on fiscal transfer from
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the central government; discretionary use of such fiscal transfer was how the domi-
nant LDP mobilized support for the party in elections (Saito, 2006; Scheiner, 2006).
Among others, construction projects in agrarian areas were one of the preferred areas
for the LDP. These projects produced demand for temporary construction workers,
many of whom were farmers.9 Ordinary construction works expenditures consist of
projects taken up solely by local governments as well as those aided by the central
government. The latter is the main interest of this research; however, a variable
which combines both categories is used, because separate variables are not readily
available.
3.4.2 Explanatory and Control Variables
There are three main explanatory variables in this research. The first two measure
the strength of the support for the governing party by the percentage of votes cast in
each of the two parts in the current electoral system for the Lower House in Japan.
As explained, the chamber’s electoral formula is a parallel plurality-PR system in
which voters face two separate voting decisions for each portion. There is a significant
diﬀerence in the percentages of the LDP votes between the two portions the electoral
systems (Figure 3.1). As the LDP fielded almost all SMD districts in both elections
in this research, there is little missing value problem caused by the unobservability
of the LDP’s SMD votes. To consider the possibility of curve-linearity caused by
governing parties’ intention to reward swing-supporters, squared terms of SMD votes
are included in the model.
9 Full-time farming households comprise only 18 percent of farming households.
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The third explanatory variable is the seniority of LDP members, measured by
the number of the terms that the LDP incumbent in the district has served as a
member of the Lower House. In the 1970s, the LDP established a seniority system
for allocating posts in the party and government. As most of senior members are
assigned to important posts such as cabinet ministers, they are more influential for
pork barrel distribution. A natural log is calculated after adding one to the variable.
Thus, it equals zero when the municipality does not have an incumbent member from
the LDP.
Several control variables are included in the model. Municipality population,
population density, and the proportion of primary industry workers are included
to control for the eﬀects of demography. The fiscal index of each municipality is
also included. This index, which essentially calculates the divergence between fiscal
demand and revenue, is the major determinant of non-earmarked transfers. In the
fiscal system of Japan, the central government compensates for the deficits by direct
transfer.
To investigate the hypotheses at diﬀerent levels, the data are organized into two
diﬀerent units: municipalities and electoral districts for SMD seats. The unit of
observation for the former is a municipality in each year from 1997 to 2002. The
number of municipalities during this time period is around 3,000; each municipality
has six observations. The main analysis is estimated by ordinary least square. In
order to deal with the issue of unobserved heterogeneity across observation, the model
is also estimated with mean subtractions for all variables. For both independent and
dependent variables, I subtract its mean for each SMD electoral district in each year
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from each value.10 When mean subtractions are conducted, the seniority variable
must be excluded from the specification, because it is perfectly collinear with the
district dummy variables. The descriptive statistics for municipality-level data are
shown in Table 3.2. For the district-level data, observations are aggregated at the
municipality level. The measurement of fiscal index at a district is calculated as the
average across municipalities in a district weighted by municipality population.
Table 3.2 : Descriptive Statistics of Variables
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max
Dependent Variables
Per Capita Total Transfer (logged) 5.458 0.797 2.230 8.928
Per Capita Construction Spending (logged) 4.889 0.783 1.765 8.897
Explanatory Variables
Number of Electorates (logged) 9.125 1.164 5.081 13.064
LDP PR Vote Share 0.385 0.103 0.064 0.774
LDP SMD Vote Share 0.516 0.165 0.030 0.947
LDP Incumbents Seniority 3.974 3.510 0.000 16.000
Primary Industry Ratio 0.166 0.116 0.002 0.794
Fiscal Index 0.377 0.222 0.040 1.120
3.5 Results
Table 3.3 shows the estimation results for the district level data. The top panel
shows the coeﬃcients for variables of interest, and the bottom panel shows those
10 This provides essentially the same results as including fixed eﬀects, but it is computationally
much faster. Since there are 300 SMD districts, there are 1,800 fixed eﬀects. Including this
many fixed eﬀects will make estimation much slower, even for OLS.
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of controls. In the first model, the dependent variable is the log-transformed per-
capita fiscal transfer to municipality governments. As expected by Hypothesis 1, the
coeﬃcient for the LDP vote-share for PR portion is significantly positive. This result
indicates that a district that gives more support to the governing LDP through party-
list votes is rewarded by higher transfer spending. In contrast, a relationship between
SMD election results and fiscal transfer is not found for individual legislators. The
governing party does not necessarily help the incumbent politician. That is, if an
empirical investigation does not distinguish support for a candidate from support for
a party, the inference might end up with a misleading conclusion that the personal
vote cultivation is a leading motivation for fiscal transfer.11 While the first model
does not include any variable that measures members’ competency, the second model
includes the seniority variable. The coeﬃcient is significantly positive: incumbent
legislators with more experience are able to exercise a substantive influence on fiscal
transfers to their districts.
With the same sets of independent variables used in the first and second models,
the third and fourth models conduct analyses for a diﬀerent dependent variable: con-
struction spending by the municipal government. Since construction spending comes
from the central government as well as the prefectural governments and taxes raised
by municipal governments, the interpretation of results might be diﬃcult. However,
since the LDP has been using local construction spending as an instrument for ma-
nipulating local government (Hirose, 1993), this variable can be used an indicator of
11 As a robustness check, the model is estimated with a squared term for LDP vote share to
capture non-monotone relation with limited samples of districts that have LDP incumbents.
The results are unchanged in terms of the sign and significance of coeﬃcients.
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the political motivated fiscal transfer. The advantage of using this variable is that
this measure does not include fiscal transfers earmarked for mandatory spending such
as compulsory education costs.12
The findings from these models are similar to those of the previous models: sup-
port for governing parties leads to the higher fiscal transfer, and strong incumbent
politicians can distribute larger transfer to their district.13 In sum, for both indica-
tors of total transfer and construction spending, the models provide evidence that
parties reward their core supporters in SMD districts. Individual electoral perfor-
mance does not have influence on fiscal transfer, but powerful members can extract
fiscal resources from the national government to local governments.
In the next set of analyses, the data are further disaggregated into each munici-
pality. The purposes of these analyses are to confirm the relationships found at the
district level at a municial level and to explore to which sub-district units influen-
tial members of governing parties are directing transfers. The core supporter model
predicts that politicians invest in groups of electorates who show concrete support
for them; in contrast, the swing voter hypothesis argues that they seek the cheapest
votes. Dividing single member districts into smaller units allows us to distinguish
these two motivations.
Table 3.4 shows the results for the municipality level analysis. I estimate two
models for each dependent variable, one with a mean-diﬀerenced variable for each
12 For instance, nine years of compulsory education is a statutory requirement for the national
government, but its actual implementation is delegated to local governments. Since the pro-
portion of younger generation varies across municipalities, per capita transfer for this budget
item also varies.
13 In this model, the coeﬃcient is statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level.
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district-year and one without. As for total transfer, LDP vote share is significantly
positive for both models. This means that the governing LDP returns the favor from
supporters with fiscal transfer, but the vote for individual members does not have
such eﬀects. This finding does not change when using the mean-diﬀerenced model,
but the eﬀect of the PR vote is much larger in this case. Since the variables are
mean-diﬀerenced at the SMD district level, there may not be any straightforward
interpretation for this result. However, this might be seen as additional support for
the core supporter theory, since it indicates that the governing party gives larger
fiscal transfer for local government even after eliminating idiosyncratic factors for
each SMD district.
Since seniority is invariant in a district in a year, its eﬀect is only estimated in
a model without mean-diﬀerence transformation. I also include an interaction term
between seniority and candidate votes. The eﬀect of seniority with interaction terms
is hard to grasp: The coeﬃcient for the constitutive term is significantly positive;
its interaction term is significantly negative with first order LDP candidate vote
share but positive with quadratic term. The total eﬀect of seniority is positive
for most ranges. To illustrate this, the substantive change in total transfer when
member seniority increases by one term is plotted in Figure 3.3(a) shows the case
when members seniority increased from one to two.14 The solid line indicates the
mean of first diﬀerence, while the shaded area indicates the 95 percent confidence
interval. The line crosses zero at around 30 percent, and the interval is above zero
when candidate vote share is over 40 percent. The eﬀect of seniority is small near the
14 Calculated by Zelig (Imai, King and Lau, 2008). The number of draw for each value of
dependent variable is 100,000.
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average value for percentage votes won by LDP incumbents (55 percent). However,
at both ends of the domain, the eﬀect is greater. The larger diﬀerence at high values
implies that legislators with more experience are able to compensate core supporters
with more fiscal transfer.
Figure 3.2 : Substantive Eﬀects of Additional Seniority
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Note: Substantive eﬀects are calculated as as change in dependent variable when seniority is
increased from one to two. I use Normal model in Zelig. The left panel is the eﬀects on total
transfer to local governments and the right panel is the eﬀects on construction spending of each
municipalities.
As Table 3.4 indicates, the coeﬃcient for constitutive term of LDP candidates’
voting percentage is negative after controlling for the eﬀect of party votes. I reesti-
mate Models 2 and 4 in Table 3.4 after removing the PR vote variable percentage
for the LDP (Table 3.5). For both dependent variables, the coeﬃcients for the first
order terms are significantly positive, and the second order term is not large enough
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to change the sign of total eﬀect in their domain. This result is the same as that of
the district level analysis. If one mistakenly considers that SMD support comes from
mainly personal vote – and therefore, fiscal transfer is the result of eﬀorts made by in-
dividual legislator – then this inference may not reflect the actual reason why groups
receive favorable treatment from government policies. Parties might show concern
for partisan supporters even under the SMD systems; under pure SMD systems,
however, support for parties and individual candidates are not distinguishable.
The analyses of construction spending exhibit similar results. As shown in the
third and fourth columns in Table 3.4, first of all, the coeﬃcients for LPD party
votes in municipalities are significantly positive in both models with and without
mean-diﬀerenced variables. In contrast, the LDP candidate vote share is negative.
The total eﬀect of seniority is positive for incumbent LDP members (Figure 3.3(b)).
Some of the estimated coeﬃcients for controls are worth noting. First, the voter
turnout has positive and statistically significant eﬀects, consistent with the findings
in Horiuchi and Saito (2009a). This indicates that the governing LDP rewarded
electorates who participated in the voting processes regardless of the direction of
their votes. This might imply turnout buying (Nichter, 2008): even though parties
are not able to determine individual voting intentions, they can reward a group of
electorates who cast votes if there are plenty of weak supporters who would not have
voted without mobilization. Another possible explanation is perverse accountability
through vote buying (Stokes, 2005): constituents have to be accountable for their
support in an election. The key premise for perverse accountability in elections is
that there must be some ways for parties to monitor voting behavior. Some argue
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that such a mechanism did exist in Japan, especially in local areas where dense
social networks make such monitoring possible (Saito, 2006, 2010).Since these two
mechanisms are not distinguishable from the data, further investigation is needed in
future research.
Second, the number of electorates has negative impacts on distributive spendings.
Since the dependent variables are measured as a log-transformed per capita transfer,
there is no intuitive way to explain how this happens. However, there are several
possible reasons. The first is the homogeneity of small municipalities. As Cox (2009)
argues, one of the key reasons for the core supporter hypothesis is that parties and
members have less uncertainty about the behavior of core supporters than weak
supporters. Small towns and villages might work as such units. The second is the
representation of their interest in small government. Since any small village has a
local assembly, locals’ interests are more likely to be represented in local assembly
(Horiuchi and Saito, 2009b). The finding here might provide additional support for
such arguments.
Third, the ratio of primary industry workers to all workers has a strong positive
eﬀect. This fits well with the conventional wisdom of Japanese politics (Rosenbluth
and Thies, 2010, Chapter 4). In order to maintain the network of local and national
politicians, fiscal transfer from central to local government was used (Scheiner, 2006).
This compensated for the lack of a safety net and has worked as a quasi welfare
policy in Japan (Estevez-Abe, 2006). Although such networks have weakened since
the electoral reform (Krauss and Pekkanen, 2010), some evidence shows this network
remains strong (McKean and Scheiner, 2000).
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3.6 Conclusion
This chapter examines the determinants of fiscal transfer to local government in
Japan in the early period of post electoral reform of 1994. It focuses on party
strategies to respond to electoral contexts and individual legislators’ influences. The
empirical results show following points. First, under the Japanese mixed electoral
system, votes casted for the governing parties are of more importance for fiscal trans-
fer, however, votes for individual candidates from the governing parties does not have
influence on fiscal transfer. These results imply that for this period of the time, the
governing parties considered party support, rather than support for individual mem-
bers, crucially important for their electoral success. Second, the empirical results
confirm the eﬀect of seniority on fiscal transfer. These results imply that incum-
bents are able to direct larger fiscal transfer to their district as they turned more
experienced, tactical politicians.
This research investigates one state with an MMM system. Most studies on
mixed systems have focused on parties, their members’ election strategies, and voters’
behavior (Shugart and Wattenberg, 2001a; Ferrara, Herron and Nishikawa, 2005;
Moser and Scheiner, 2004), while have focused on legislative behavior, in particular,
how legislators elected from diﬀerent tiers exhibit diﬀerent patterns (Stratmann and
Baur, 2002; Bawn and Thies, 2003). However, little attention has been paid to the
policy outcomes of MMM system with a few exceptions (e.g. Thames and Edwards,
2006). The theoretical arguments and empirical investigation presented here draws
on the utility of mixed motivations created by the two-tier system. Such MMM
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systems in which electorates make voting decisions in two tiers provide an excellent
field to disentangle parties’ and individual members’ strategies and influences.
Related to this point, the findings of this chapter suggests that the importance
of party supports as a determinant of the governing party’s policy-making. Schick-
ler and Green (1997) demonstrate the varying stability of partisan support across
countries. When party support is stable, parties have a good reason to maintain
their bases by providing benefits to their supporters. Party support has long-term,
stable impacts on their electoral performance. Under pure-SMD systems, support
for parties and individual candidates are diﬃcult to separate. However, the out-
comes of party-based and candidate-based electoral competition are conceptually
distinguishable. This calls for careful treatment of this diﬀerence to reach profound
understanding of the interaction between elections and policy-making.
The last point worth mentioning in regard to the party competition in Japan is
the possibility of parties moving away from any particularistic spending in recent
years. The theoretical work of this chapter implicitly assumes that the total amount
of resources allocated by governing parties is fixed. Parties have multiple competing
goals in determining such allocation; members attempt to distribute their share of
allocation to their supporters in order to secure their reelection. However, for various
reasons, governing parties might reduce spending either voluntarily or reluctantly.
Such reasons include demographic shifts which reduce the importance of existing po-
litical groups, changes in the electoral system, and globalization of the economy which
gives little room for fiscal manipulation by the government. This chapter focuses on
the early period after reform, during which the LDP had the ability of and motivation
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for fiscal manipulation. This situation has changed since the early 2000s. The LDP
perceived the demunition of malapportionment through electoral reform (Horiuchi
and Saito, 2003); thus, the party weakened its ties with local politicians and groups
of traditional core supporters of the LDP (Horiuchi and Saito, 2009b; Rosenbluth
and Thies, 2010, Chapter 7). This change resulted in the decline of particularistic
spending (Noble, 2010), leading the shift of the LDP and other Japanese parties from
clientelistic to programmatic. Sometimes, being clientelistic incurs electoral costs on
governing parties (Weitz-Shapiro, Forthcoming 2012); therefore, parties might have
an incentive to shift their spending target to public goods. Analyzing the transitions
in Japanese politics in the context of strategic shifts of parties will be a subject of
future research.
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Table 3.3 : Estimates of Electoral Incentives on Fiscal Transfer (District Level)
Total Transfer Construction
LDP PR Vote Share 0.608∗ 0.560∗ 1.292∗ 1.200∗
(0.222) (0.223) (0.192) (0.192)
LDP Candidate Vote Share −0.121 −0.408 −0.141 −0.697
(0.419) (0.441) (0.363) (0.380)
(LDP Candidate Vote Share)2 0.166 0.361 −0.264 0.114
(0.450) (0.459) (0.390) (0.396)
LDP Seniority 0.032∗ 0.062∗
(0.015) (0.013)
log(Number of Electorates) −0.335∗ −0.354∗ −0.104 −0.140∗
(0.066) (0.066) (0.057) (0.057)
Voter Turnout 1.646∗ 1.652∗ 1.232∗ 1.243∗
(0.201) (0.201) (0.174) (0.173)
Primary Industry 0.064∗ 0.064∗ 0.041∗ 0.042∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Fiscal Index −0.725∗ −0.713∗ 0.030 0.054
(0.044) (0.045) (0.039) (0.039)
Intercept 7.643∗ 7.931∗ 4.352∗ 4.909∗
(0.892) (0.902) (0.774) (0.778)
N 1426 1426 1426 1426
R2 0.733 0.734 0.511 0.518
Residual Standard Errors 0.385 0.385 0.334 0.332
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
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Table 3.4 : Estimates of Electoral Incentives on Fiscal Transfer (Municipality Level)
Total Transfer Construction
Mean Diﬀerenced No Yes No Yes
LDP PR Vote Share 0.261∗ 1.137∗ 0.547∗ 1.277∗
(0.031) (0.060) (0.064) (0.112)
LDP Candidate Vote Share −0.564∗ −0.177∗ −1.268∗ −0.466∗
(0.094) (0.041) (0.196) (0.076)
(LDP Candidate Vote Share)2 0.371∗ −0.079∗ 0.921∗ 0.037
(0.106) (0.013) (0.219) (0.025)
LDP Seniority 0.103∗ 0.175∗
(0.019) (0.039)
LDP Candidate Share × LDP Seniority −0.344∗ −0.552∗
(0.075) (0.157)
(LDP Candidate Vote Share)2×LDP Seniority 0.297∗ 0.495∗
(0.075) (0.156)
log(Number of Electorates) −0.171∗ −0.314∗ −0.271∗ −0.257∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
Voter Turnout 0.809∗ 1.826∗ 1.337∗ 1.994∗
(0.028) (0.043) (0.058) (0.080)
Primary Industry 0.228∗ 0.383∗ 0.989∗ 0.678∗
(0.023) (0.026) (0.047) (0.048)
Fiscal Index −2.292∗ −0.462∗ −0.349∗ 0.032
(0.017) (0.011) (0.035) (0.020)
Intercept 4.980∗ 0.197∗ 2.778∗ −0.023∗
(0.031) (0.006) (0.064) (0.012)
N 17689 17689 17689 17689
R2 0.893 0.814 0.522 0.452
Residual Standard Errors 0.260 0.248 0.541 0.460
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
For mean diﬀerenced model, year-district means are subtracted from both dependent and
independent variables
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Table 3.5 : Estimates of Electoral Incentives on Fiscal Transfer (Municipality Level,
No PR Votes)
Total Transfer Construction
LDP Candidate Vote Share 0.403∗ 0.185∗
(0.028) (0.051)
(LDP Candidate Vote Share)2 −0.073∗ 0.043
(0.014) (0.025)
log(Number of Electorates) −0.321∗ −0.264∗
(0.003) (0.006)
Voter Turnout 1.957∗ 2.142∗
(0.043) (0.079)
Primary Industry 0.489∗ 0.797∗
(0.025) (0.047)
Intercept 0.198∗ −0.023
(0.006) (0.012)
N 17689 17689
R2 0.810 0.448
Residual Standard Errors 0.250 0.462
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
Year-district means are subtracted from both dependent and independent variables
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Chapter 4
The Eﬀects of Party Control on Committee
Assignments in the Taiwanese Legislative Yuan
Chapter Abstract
Some scholars of the US Congress have emphasized self-selection as a key dynamic of
committee assignments, and legislative institutions have been developed to provide a
stable legislative exchange. This chapter investigates how the shift from the absence
to the presence of such institutions changes the mechanism of self-selection using data
regarding committee assignments in the Taiwanese Legislative Yuan. Committees
in the Legislative Yuan are an appropriate subject because its elections are highly
personalized, so incentives for self-selection are as strong as they are in the case of
the US Congress. In particular, this chapter studies the eﬀect of the 2001 reforms
in the committee systems of the Legislative Yuan, which installed party control in
committee assignments. I test this argument with an original dataset regarding
committee assignments from 1995-2007.
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4.1 Introduction
This chapter attempts to show how the exercise of party influence aﬀects the indi-
vidual members’ personal goals using the data for the committee assignments of the
Legislative Yuan members from 1995 to 2007 (from the third to the sixth legisla-
ture). I specifically focus on the impact of institutional change to establish party
control over committee assignments. In the early periods of the Legislative Yuan,
parties did not control the committee assignments, which created a problem in that
conflict between individual interests resulted in coordination failure. This chapter
will investigate how the modification of the rules of committee assignment resolved
this problem.
Parties in a legislature organize the legislative institutions, which will prevent
members’ excessive demands for limited resources, such as time in the legislature or
fiscal resources, from leading to the breakdown of the exchange of benefits between
members. Committee membership is one such limited resource because of the fixed
number of committee members. In the study of committees in the US Congress,
committee assignments have been seen as an instrument to enable stable, long-term
relationships (Weingast and Marshall, 1988) and parties control it (Kiewiet and Mc-
Cubbins, 1991).
As is shown in Chapter 2, even in Japan, a country with a parliamentary regime
where individualistic legislative behavior is less salient than presidential regimes, the
assignment of committee seats is aﬀected by the factors linked to members’ individual
interests. In addition, this association is particularly strong for opposition members
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because legislative behavior has more crucial importance for opposition members, as
their opportunities to influence actual policy outcomes are more limited than those
of the members of governing parties (Chapter 3).
Taiwan is a country with a semi-presidential regime in which the executive branch
has a strong influence on the legislature. For instance, most crucial pieces of legis-
lation are submitted by the government, and the bill success rate is much higher for
government bills than for member bills (Sheng, 2003, 2006). Despite these factors
that reduce the importance of the Legislative Yuan, its standing committees have
played an important role in the legislative process (Batto, 2005), and it has been
shown that Legislative Yuan members consider it important to get a position in the
committee related to their electorates’ interests and policy goals (Hsiao, 2007).
The outline of this chapter is as follows. The next section provides a brief de-
scription of the committee system of the Legislative Yuan, including the selection
mechanisms before and after the reform. Subsequently, the hypothesis is presented.
Section 3 introduces the data and explains the model specification, followed by a
section containing the empirical analysis. The last section concludes the chapter.
4.2 Committee System in the Legislative Yuan
In contrast to the US or Japanese example, the scholarship has argued that the Leg-
islative Yuan members do not acquire strong policy expertise (Hsiao, 2005). There
are several reasons that they do not develop policy expertise(Sheng, 2000; Hsiao,
2005). The first is the absence of a seniority system in committee assignments.
There was no party control over of committee seat assignments before 2002. The
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Legislative Yuan members independently submitted applications for a committee
seat, and if the number of applicants did not exceed the maximum number of seats,
they were granted a seat on the committee they wanted.
Second because the former dictatorial party, Kuomintang (KMT), dominated the
policy-making authority for years after democratization, intraparty policy-making in
KMT was more important than that in the Legislative Yuan. The substance of
each policy proposal was determined by the executive branch, and KMT members in
the Legislative Yuan supported the party agenda. Third, before the introduction of
fully democratic elections in 1992, most Legislative Yuan members were non-elected.
The original members of the Yuan in 1949 comprised the non-elected part of the
members, and they did not have to worry about their reelection. Though partial
elections for additional members had been held since 1969, these democratically
elected members had never become the majority of the chamber. For these reasons,
even after instituting a fully democratic electoral system, the Legislative Yuan was
not considered to be a principal decision-making body.
These points gradually changed in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Regarding the
first point, the rules for committee assignments were altered in 2001, when the reform
of committee system, as a part of the reform of the Legislative Yuan, was adopted
in the last session of the fourth term and implemented at the start of the fifth term.
The motivation behind the committee reforms was to enhance the development of
members’ expertise and to improve the eﬀectiveness of bill proceedings. Under the
new rule, committee assignments became partisan. In each session, which starts
every half-year, committee seats are first allocated to parties, and then the parties
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pick members for each committee from among their members. The introduction of
party control over the committee assignments seemed to have crucial importance in
the relationship between members’ demands for committee seats and voting results.
Regarding the second point, the DPP presidency since 2000 and the KMT’s
loss of the majority in the Legislative Yuan in 2001 changed the situation (Sheng,
2003). The legislative process in the Legislative Yuan became more crucial after 2001
because the general elections of the Legislative Yuan failed to produce a majority
coalition in the chamber. Regarding the third problem, through several elections,
most of the former non-elected members left the chamber.
Despite the perception that the committees were not important bodies in pass-
ing legislation, membership allocations were not as random as one might expect.
Table 4.1shows the numbers and proportions of members who served on the same
committees in one term. Even in the period without party control for committee
assignments, more than half of the Legislative Yuan members served on the same
committee in more than three sessions out of six terms in interelectoral periods be-
fore the committee reform (the third and fourth terms), and this figure became even
larger after the reform (the fifth and sixth terms). After the reform, three-quarters
of all members served on the same committee for more than three sessions, and two-
fifths served on the same committee for all six sessions. As Hsiao (2005) shows, some
parties have established seniority rule since the committee reform, while others have
not. Assignments of members and chairs by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)
follows seniority rule. Other parties do not have a specific rule, but this tendency
seems to extend to other parties.
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Table 4.1 : Maximum Number of Sessions A Member Served in a Committee
Number of sessions served in one committee
Term 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total
3 1 3 31 44 37 30 23 169
4 0 7 40 72 38 40 31 228
5 1 8 16 39 42 38 87 231
6 0 7 14 44 50 46 75 236
Number of session served in one committee
Term 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total
3 0.01 0.02 0.18 0.26 0.22 0.18 0.14 1.00
4 0.00 0.03 0.18 0.32 0.17 0.18 0.14 1.00
5 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.38 1.00
6 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.19 0.21 0.19 0.32 1.00
Note: The top panel shows the count, and the bottom panel shows the proportion
of each category.
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When looking at legislative behavior other than committee assignments, the gen-
eral patterns of Legislative Yuan members’ initiation of bills are also changing. As
Sheng (2003, 2006) illustrates, the legislation initiated by legislators has come to
comprise an important part of legislation (Sheng, 2006, Table 2). Especially under
divided governments, many important bills have been introduced as member bills by
KMT members.
Electoral pressure is the primary motivation of Legislative Yuan members for
aﬃliating with a specific committee. The system for Yuan elections before the intro-
duction of the current system in 2008 was a mixed-member system in which a general
election for the Legislative Yuan was held under a parallel single nontransferable vote
(SNTV) and proportional representation (PR).
The majority of members were elected in SNTV elections in which the electoral
districts were counties and cities, while a smaller number of members were elected
from closed-list PR elections from the at-large national district. Take an example
from the sixth term, for which the general election was held in December 2004; the
total number of seats was 225, 168 were elected from SNTV districts, 41 elected
through PR, and another 17 elected from aboriginal and overseas districts. Since the
two portions are not compensatory, this system can be categorized as a variation of
mixed-member majoritarian systems (Shugart and Wattenberg, 2001b). Though the
size of the chamber altered in each election, the combination of SNTV and closed-list
PR was used throughout the period of this study.
SNTV is known to be one of the most individualistic voting systems (Carey and
Shugart, 1995). Under SNTV, candidates from the same party cannot transfer votes
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cast for them, so they have to compete against each other. Since party labels do not
help to distinguish candidates from their co-partisans, they have to make personal
appeals to attract votes.
The legislative activity of Legislative Yuan members was influenced by the elec-
toral system, and previous studies have shown that members elected from diﬀerent
tiers have diﬀerent perception about their role as a representative and behave diﬀer-
ently. In the fifth term of the Legislative Yuan, more than sixty percent of SNTV
members considered gaining recognition and support from electorates as most im-
portant, while only twenty percent of PR members considered this important. In
contrast, the proportion of members who thought that their primary role was to
accomplish their political ideals or to support party agenda was much higher for PR
members than for SNTV members (Hsiao, 2007). In addition, the electorate has
diﬀerent expectations about Legislative Yuan members’ pork distribution depending
on the strength of the connections between the members and specific geographic ar-
eas (Luor, 2008). Luor and Hsieh (2008) show that members from smaller districts,
which usually require members seeking reelection to have a closer relationship with
their constituents, introduce more bills related to distributive politics.
Likewise, I expect that incentives to cultivate personal votes play a key role in
committee assignments for members from SNTV districts, while PR members do
not have strong incentives to do so. For instance, Legislative Yuan members who
are vulnerable in an election have an incentive to show themselves to be skilled
legislators who can introduce policies beneficial to their districts, while members
who are selected from regions with high demand for social welfare have an incentive
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to have membership on committees for social policy.
4.3 Literature and Theory
Theoretical developments regarding committee assignments have mostly been made
through research on the US Congress. There are three main competing theories, each
of which makes particular predictions regarding the composition of congressional
committees. The first theory is the distributive theory of congressional committees,
which posits that committees are composed of legislators with high demand for that
policy area (Weingast and Marshall, 1988). The second and third theories are the
informational theory (Krehbiel, 1992) and the partisan theory (Cox and McCubbins,
2007).
The committee assignments under the distributive theory are characterized as a
process of self-selection. Winning reelection is the primary goal of incumbent con-
gressional members (Mayhew, 1974), and, to achieve this goal, they try to make the
most of the available resources at their disposal. Working on a standing committee
is one such resource, so they demand a seat on a committee strongly related to their
district interests (Adler and Lapinski, 1997). Congressional members have developed
legislative institutions to protect their benefits produced by stable exchange, and for
committee seats, the property rights of incumbent members have been established
(Weingast and Marshall, 1988).
This discussion of members of the Congress is pertinent to the committee mem-
bership of the Taiwanese Legislative Yuan if the focus is on the proper group of mem-
bers. The dual electoral systems create diﬀerent electoral incentives for the members
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(Hsiao, 2007), and this aﬀects the policy behavior of the members (Luor and Hsieh,
2008). For instance, governing party members elected in SNTV elections, especially
from district with a small district magnitude, have a strong influence on distributive
spending (Luor, 2000). The requests for committee assignments by Legislative Yuan
members reflect such electoral incentives (Batto, 2005), so the self-selection argument
is particularly applicable for committee assignments in the Legislative Yuan.
This “demand-side” theory was especially true for the period until the fourth term
of the Legislative Yuan, when parties were not authorized to control their members’
requests. In that period, a few committees that were popular among distribution-
oriented members garnered many applications, exceeding the maximum number of
seats for these committees.
These excessive demands were detrimental to the Legislative Yuan members.
Since the membership for the committees in demand was determined by lottery,
members could not continuously serve on a popular committee, which discouraged
the development of policy expertise among Legislative Yuan members, and legisla-
tive oversight over government decisions was ineﬀective. Furthermore, under this
system, there was no proper means of distinguishing members with high demand
from those with low demand. Since any member could apply to serve on these pop-
ular committees, members with weak demand had an incentive to request seats on
these committees hoping for a stroke of luck.
In the face of these problems, the Legislative Yuan decided to introduce reform
of the committee system (see Section 4.2) as a part of the Legislative Yuan reform
approved at the end of the fourth term. Under the new system, which is called
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the party proportionality system, committee seats are first distributed to parties
in proportion to their seats in the chamber, and the parties determine the actual
membership.
This reform was intended to encourage members to develop policy expertise, so
it was expected to have an impact on the committee membership. One of goals of
political parties is to coordinate the interests of the members, and according to Hsiao
(2007), parties take members’ electoral interests into consideration in the allocation of
committee seats.1 Due to such considerations by parties, we can expect the following
change in committee membership from a situation without party control to one with
party control over the membership:
Hypothesis 4.1 (Party Control of Committee Assignments) The eﬀects of elec-
toral incentives on committee assignments are stronger when party control is estab-
lished than when it is not.
4.4 Data and Methods
In this chapter, I consider committee assignments from the third to the sixth terms
of the Legislative Yuan (1995-2007). The data regarding committee assignments was
collected by the author.
1 For instance, a KMT caucus said “PR members cannot compete for their rights with SNTV
members, and PR members usually do not receive a favor from the party” (Hsiao, 2007).
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4.4.1 Dependent Variables
The main dependent variables are the number of times a member was assigned to
a specific type of committee in a three-year period of each legislature. Since the
committee members were reshuﬄed in each session of a half-year, each member had
six opportunities to obtain a seat on committees. I counted the number of times
members served as committee members. If a member served on one committee for
the entire period of the legislature, the variable takes the value of six. After recording
the values for all the committees, I aggregated the observation based on the types of
committees they served on using the classification used in several previous articles
(see Batto, 2007, 2005). There are three diﬀerent types of committees: money, high
policy, and other committees.
Money committees are committees of one of two types. The first type is a com-
mittee concerned with jurisdictions that require a large amount of funding to im-
plement policies, such as the Transportation Committee, which administers public
construction projects. Another type of committees includes those concerned with the
distribution of spending itself. Because the chance to oversee pork-barrel projects
is higher for these committees, they are popular among Legislative Yuan members
(Hsiao, 2007). The committees in this category include the Finance, Economics,
Transportation, and Budget and Accounts committees.
High policy committees are committees that discuss typical high policies such as
the judicial or legal system (Judicial Committee) and foreign policy (Foreign Aﬀairs
Committee) or committees for the management of the Legislative Yuan (the Disci-
pline and Rules Committees). These committees were not popular among Legislative
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Yuan members, and their memberships did not reach the maximum.
4.4.2 Independent Variables
This study uses three independent variables. The first two variables are related to
the characteristics of electoral districts, and the third variable is related to party
control of committee membership.2 I utilize two variables that are aimed to measure
the type of support that an incumbent mustered in the previous election. The first
variable, district member is a dummy variable that indicates the electoral system
from which a member was elected. SNTV is a system that enhances personal vote
cultivation (Carey and Shugart, 1995), so members from the SNTV portion have a
stronger demand for pork. The variable takes a value of one when a member was
elected from an SNTV district.
The second variable is each member’s vote concentration in an SNTV district.
Some members’ votes were concentrated on one area in their district, while oth-
ers spread their support over a broader area. This diﬀerence in electoral support
changed the incumbents’ strategy under SNTV (McCubbins and Rosenbluth, 1995;
Tatebayashi and McKean, 2002). In this study, I use Mizusaki’s RS-index, which
measures the weighted average of deviation from the individual vote mean across
sub-units in a district.3
2 District characteristics are not included in this analysis, because district magnitude is too
large to use a proxy for the characteristics of constituents, and sub-district level data were not
available.
3 The formula is: ￿
i
qj |pij − pi|
2pi
where qj in indicates the proportion of votes from sub-unit j, pi is the proportion of votes
98
The third independent variable, no party control, is a dummy variable for the
committee member appointment rules. As explained in the previous section, when
the number of applications for committee membership exceeded the maximum num-
ber of committee seats, memberships were awarded using a lottery during the second
to fourth terms of the Legislative Yuan. After the fifth term of the Legislative Yuan,
a new rule was used in which the committee seats were allocated to each party in
proportion to their share of the legislative seats, and party caucuses were placed
in charge of selecting members. This chapter’s hypothesis argues that this change
helped in the coordination of the members’ interests and helped members with high
demand to obtain committee seats. This no party control variable takes a value
of one for the third and fourth terms and zero for the fifth and sixth terms. As a
control, the seniority of a member, measured by the number of the Legislative Yuan
terms a member served, is also included. Summary statistics for these independent
variables are shown in 4.2.
The two dependent variables used in this analysis are count variables bounded
by six. Assuming that each count is an independent Bernoulli trial, I use a binomial
regression model with a logistic link. Interaction terms between no party control and
two other independent variables are included in the analysis.
candidate i wins in the entire district, and pij is the proportion of vote i gets in sub-unit j.
The range of this index is [0,1], where higher value means higher vote concentration in a small
area. For further explanation of this index, see Hirano (2006). Another concentration index
is used in Batto (2005). If this index is used instead of RS-index, the empirical results in the
following section become much stronger.
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Table 4.2 : Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max N
RS-Index 0.218 0.101 0.000 0.617 627
Seniority 1.973 1.102 1 6 864
Variable 0 1 N
District Member 237 627 864
No Party Control 467 397 864
4.5 Empirical Analysis
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show the count and proportion for the two dependent variables,
money committees and high policy committees, in each term. The top panel of each
table shows the count of individual legislators’ aﬃliations with money or high policy
committees, and the bottom panels indicate the proportion of legislators in each term.
As Table 4.3 indicates, the patterns of money committee aﬃliation changed from
the no party-control to the party-control periods. In the party-control period, the
number of legislators who were not aﬃliated with any money committees throughout
the period was smaller, while a larger proportion of legislators became members of
money committees at least once in the period. In addition, during the no party-
control period, members who served a small number of terms, 1-4, comprise a larger
proportion than in the party-control period, while the proportion of members with
the maximum number of sessions increased substantially. As discussed in Section
4.3, when parties did not have control over the committee assignments, the requests
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of members with low demand might block those of members with high demand.
Table 4.3 : Number of Session a Member Served in Money Committees
Number of sessions served in money committees
Session 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total
3 51 23 18 15 15 24 23 169
4 61 37 34 29 35 22 10 228
5 101 21 15 19 18 20 37 231
6 113 17 15 14 19 19 39 236
Number of sessions served in money committees
Session 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total
3 0.30 0.14 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.14 0.14 1.00
4 0.27 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.10 0.04 1.00
5 0.44 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.16 1.00
6 0.48 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.17 1.00
Note: The top panel shows the count, and the bottom panel shows the proportion
of each category.
In contrast, Table 4.4 shows a less clear illustration of the change created by the
establishment of party control. While the proportion of legislators who served on
high policy committees for only one session is smaller and the number of members
who served on these committees for the entire term increased, the change in size is
smaller. This is also expected based on the theoretical discussion; since the demand
for these committee seats does not exceed the supply, introducing party control would
not change the practice of committee assignments as much. However, as the following
empirical analysis shows, there was a change in high policy committee assignments
after the implementation of party control.
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Table 4.4 : Number of Session a Member Served in High Policy Committees
Number of sessions served in high policy committees
Session 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total
3 74 34 23 10 13 5 10 169
4 122 45 22 14 6 9 10 228
5 142 26 16 10 7 8 22 231
6 142 34 13 9 9 10 19 236
Number of sessions served in high policy committees
Session 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total
3 0.44 0.20 0.14 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.06 1.00
4 0.54 0.20 0.10 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.04 1.00
5 0.61 0.11 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.10 1.00
6 0.60 0.14 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.08 1.00
Note: The top panel shows the count, and the bottom panel shows the proportion
of each category.
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The analysis for all legislators is shown in Table 4.5. Each column shows the
results for each of two dependent variables. In the model for money committees,
the eﬀect of district member is significantly positive, and since the coeﬃcient for its
interaction term with no party control is much smaller than the constitutive term,
the eﬀect of district member, whether or not a member was elected from an SNTV
election, is positive regardless of party control. The theory anticipates that district
demand will increase the chance for members to be selected as money committee
members, and this result confirms the expectation.
Table 4.5 : Committee Assignments for Money and High Policy Committees (All
Legislators)
Money High Policy
Intercept −1.461∗ −1.096∗
(0.105) (0.102)
Seniority 0.039 0.071∗
(0.027) (0.031)
No Party Control 0.359∗ 0.089
(0.127) (0.118)
Distrct Member 1.043∗ −0.597∗
(0.100) (0.099)
(No Party Control)*District Member −0.283∗ −0.023
(0.143) (0.146)
N 864 864
AIC 4623.319 3786.118
BIC 4718.550 3881.350
logL −2291.659 −1873.059
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
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The estimated coeﬃcient for the constitutive term of no party control is sig-
nificantly positive. This is also expected; when parties do not control committee
assignments, members’ demand will create conflicts of interest, and this result will
work in favor of members with weaker demand. However, after including an in-
teraction term, the results change. Figure 4.1 shows the substantive eﬀects of two
main variables. The left figure shows the diﬀerence between SNTV districts and PR
members. Each point indicates the mean of the predicted diﬀerence, and each line
indicates a 95 percent confidence interval of diﬀerence in the predicted probability.
I calculate the prediction for two separate cases: the left is the eﬀect when party
control for assignments is present, while the left is the case without party control.
For both cases, the predicted diﬀerence is significantly positive, which means that
SNTV members are much more likely to be assigned to money committees. How-
ever, the diﬀerence is smaller in the situation of no party control. This result implies
that members with high demand (SNTV legislators) under no party control are less
diﬀerent from PR legislators than they are under party control.
The right figure (Figure 4.2(a)) illustrates the eﬀect of party control for diﬀerent
types of members. The eﬀect of party control is significantly positive for PR legisla-
tors, while for SNTV legislators, the diﬀerence is not distinguishable from zero. This
result means that PR legislators, who do not have a strong need for pork, still request
seats on money committees when party control is not present, but their demands are
not given much priority in the party-based selection of committee members.
The above analyses utilize the electoral system under which members were elected
as an indicator for determining the legislators’ demand for a seat on a money commit-
104
Figure 4.1 : Predicted Diﬀerence in The Probability for Money Committee Assign-
ments (All Legislators)
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Note: The left panel is the eﬀects of district member under the diﬀerent conditions of party
control, and the right panel is the eﬀects of party control for two types of legislators. I use Logit
model in Zelig.
tee. The following analysis utilizes another variable that also captures the members’
demand. Table 4.6 shows the estimated coeﬃcients for models with the RS-index.
The number of observations is smaller for this model because the values for the RS-
index are missing for PR members, and these observations are excluded. The basic
finding is the same as in the previous analysis. The constitutive term for vote concen-
tration is significantly positive, and no party control variable is almost significantly
positive, while the coeﬃcient for the interaction term is negative.
To illustrate the relations between the two main independent variables, I plot a
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Table 4.6 : Committee Assignments for Money and High Policy Committees (District
Legislators Only)
Money High Policy
Intercept −0.836∗ −0.544∗
(0.128) (0.164)
Seniority 0.038 −0.051
(0.031) (0.041)
No Party Control 0.311 −0.361
(0.159) (0.204)
Vote Concentration 1.948∗ −4.478∗
(0.447) (0.665)
(No Party Control)*(Vote Concentration) −1.125 2.177∗
(0.655) (0.935)
N 627 627
AIC 3500.993 2439.335
BIC 3589.812 2528.154
logL −1730.496 −1199.667
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
District fixed eﬀects are omitted.
predicted probability of gaining seats on money committees in the value range of the
RS-index (Figure 4.2). Two lines indicate the cases with and without party control
over committee assignments. The solid line is the prediction under party control,
and the dashed line is the prediction under no party control. The shaded regions
indicate 95 percent confidence intervals of prediction. For both situations, the eﬀect
of vote concentration is positive, but the slope is steeper for party-controlled cases.
As expected by Hypothesis 4.1, when parties control the assignment of committee
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seats, the requests of members with high demand have a better chance to be fulfilled
because of the success of coordination implemented by party leaders.
Figure 4.2 : Predicted Probability of Money Committee Assignments
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indicates the one under no party-control. The shaded regions indicate 95% confident intervals. I
use Logit model in Zelig to obtain the prediction.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter studied the mechanism of committee assignments in the Legislative
Yuan. Given the presence of strong personal vote incentives under the SNTV sys-
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tem, this chapter particularly emphasized the importance of legislative institutions
that keep individual members’ demands in order and prevent excessive demands
for limited committee seats from resulting in tragedy of the commons. Potentially,
there are multiple institutional solutions to this problem. For example, in the US
Congress, the solution was to establish property rights to committee seats for in-
cumbent members and the seniority rule. The Taiwanese Legislative Yuan adopted
a diﬀerent solution, which is party control over committee membership. The empir-
ical results of this chapter show that this solution was successful: After introducing
the reforms for committee assignments, committee memberships became more stable
and reflected the members’ electoral incentives more strongly than before.
Taiwan is a young democracy that just observed its seventh legislative election
and fifth presidential election in January 2012. In the early period, many aspects
of the Legislative Yuan were not institutionalized. For instance, a member could
serve as a committee director for only one session in a term, which disturbed the
expertise of committee membership (Hsiao, 2005), and there was no oﬃcial mecha-
nism to resolve the situation of gridlock in the case of the lack of a clear majority
in the Legislative Yuan (Yang and Chen, 2004). These problems have been resolved
through the development of oﬃcial institutions in the Legislative Yuan. Investigating
this institutional development in the context of a comparative study of legislative
institutions will be my future research agenda.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
A monkey that has fallen oﬀ a tree is still a monkey, but a politician who has lost an
election is a nobody.
–Banboku Ohno, The Former LDP Vice President
As this famous quote from an LDP strongman eloquently illustrates,1 securing
reelection is the most important goal for politicians. Without achieving this goal,
they cannot pursue their political career in any sense. This dissertation examined
how political institutions, especially electoral systems, shape incumbent politicians’
reelection strategies, and how political parties coordinate such strategies. In this
brief concluding chapter, I summarize the findings from each chapter then address
the future research agenda.
Chapter 2investigates how parties in the Japanese House of Representatives use
standing committee appointments and activities to achieve their legislative and elec-
toral goals, focusing on the diﬀerence between governing and opposition parties. For
opposition parties, committees are an important arena for developing party repu-
tation and their members’ personal appeals for reelection. Therefore, opposition
parties exhibit strong connections between parties’ or members’ needs and actual
1 Many studies cite this quote including Inoguchi and Iwai (1989) and Saito (2006).
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committee activities. For important committees, where parties need to advance the
partisan agenda, opposition parties send more competent members who can deliver
messages more eﬀectively. In contrast, for committees which serve members’ needs
for distribution, opposition parties are likely to assign members with strong interests
in a district or members who are electorally vulnerable. With regard to attendance,
members from governing parties are more likely to attend committee meetings than
opposition party members. Finally, as to the rule of unconstrained temporary re-
placements of committee membership, governing and opposition parties both take
advantage of the rule, but each utilizes this rule for diﬀerent purposes. The govern-
ing parties use it to maximize the probability of passing legislation, while opposition
parties use it to advance policy debates and provide members with credit-claiming
opportunities.
In another chapter, I further pursued the research topic of the mechanism of com-
mittee assignments by exploring these in the Taiwanese Legislative Yuan (Chapter
4). This chapter particularly focuses on the development of political institution and
its eﬀects. Given the presence of strong personal vote incentives under the SNTV
system, this chapter particularly emphasized the importance of legislative institu-
tions that prevent individual members’ demands for limited committee seats from
resulting in a tragedy of the commons. As a newly democratized legislature, many
legislative institutions are not well developed and Legislative Yuan members had not
had an eﬀective coordination mechanism. The chamber finally introduced such a
mechanism by enforcing party control over committee membership. The empirical
results of this chapter show that this solution was successful in preventing a tragedy
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of the commons: After introducing the reforms for committee assignments, commit-
tee memberships became more stable and reflected the members’ electoral incentives
more strongly than before.
In the second chapter on the Japanese Diet, I examined the determinants of fiscal
transfers to local governments in Japan in the early period following the electoral
reform of 1994 (Chapter 3). It focuses on the governing parties’ strategies to respond
to electoral contexts and individual legislators’ influences. The empirical results
show that under the current mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system, governing
parties are more responsive to party votes. This result implies that governing parties
considered party support, rather than support for individual members, as crucially
important for electoral success. Though little attention has been paid to the policy
outcomes of the MMM system, the empirical results of this chapter demonstrate the
importance and usefulness of MMM systems for studying the dynamics of parties and
their members’ interactions. MMM systems provide an excellent setting in which to
disentangle parties’ and individual members’ strategies and influences.
In closing this conclusion, I would like to address three directions of my future
research from this dissertation. The first is to analyze temporary membership re-
placements as a policy network. A particularly interesting question is whether or not
the LDP intra-party factions are policy-oriented groups. In the conventional under-
standing, the LDP factions are considered to be groups composed of a leader and his
followers in which the leader provides benefits in return for followers’ contributions
to the leader’s intra-party power struggles. Though sometimes the diﬀerences in
policy interests between factions are mentioned, that is not considered to be the key
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issue distinguishing one faction from others. By comparing the density of factions’
networks in each policy area, this research can provide new insights not only on the
role of LDP factions, but also on intra-party competition in a party where members
are highly individualistic.
The second is to address the change of legislative behaviors of Legislative Yuan
members after electoral reform in 2009. The reform changed the system of district
elections from SNTV to a single member district system while simultaneously cutting
the number of Legislative Yuan members in half. These changes should have had
an influence on the electoral incentives of members. They have just concluded the
first three-year term under the new electoral system, and there is an opportunity for
future research.
The last is to extend the scope of fiscal transfer analysis to the period after the fall
of the LDP in 2008. After the electoral reform, some argued that party competition
in House of Representatives elections had gradually been shifting from competition
based on clientelistic appeals to more programmatic appeals (e.g. Noble, 2010). In
addition, in the 2009 general election, the Democratic Party in Japan (DPJ) won
a landslide victory, strongly backed by their policy appeals. Empirical research to
check the validity of these points is much awaited. The broader implication of this
research is about the long-term and short-term eﬀects of institutional change. One
interpretation of the findings of Chapter 3 in this dissertation is that, in the short-
term, electoral reform had caused a shift in distributive policy decision-making from
individual members to the governing party. Future research would show that the
further shift in party competition also had taken place.
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